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DO YOU SWEAR TO TELL THE TRUTH,
THE WHOLE TRUTH, AND NOTHING
BUT THE TRUTH AGAINST YOUR CHILD?
Hillary B. Farber*
Currently in the United States there is no federally recognized parentchild privilege. The U.S. Supreme Court has never grantedcertiorariin
a case involving the recognition of a parent-childprivilege. For many,
it is a revelation to learn that the government can compel testimony
about communications and observations between parents and their
children. Scholars have written about the social policy implications
caused by the lack of a parent-child privilege. In spite of these
thoughtful policy-based arguments, neither Congress norforty-six state
legislatures have responded by recognizing even a limited form of a
parent-childprivilege. This Article singles out one specific context-the
prosecution ofjuveniles-and argues that such a privilege is essential
in order to ensure children the due process protections guaranteed to
them under law. In an effort to contextualize the socio-legalproblem
and the solution, this Article provides a historicaloverview ofprivilege
law in the United States and compares the parent-childrelationshipto
relationships that are protected by an evidentiary privilege. It singles
out the importance of parent-child communications in light of the
biological and psycho-social differences between adolescents and
adults and links these findings to the argument that a juvenile's right
against self-incrimination requires the recognition of a parent-child
privilege. An exploration of antecedents in comparative law traditions
reveals that the United States lags behind other developed nations when
it comes to rules that shield family members from acting as witnesses
againstone another.
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TESTIFY AGAINST YOUR CHILD?
INTRODUCTION

On June 8, 1984, the body of a female letter carrier was found in
the woods in the northwest section of Houston.' Bloodhounds traced
the woman's scent to the home of Bernard and Odette Port, the
parents of seventeen-year-old David Port. David was missing, his
parents were concerned, and so they allowed the police to search
their home for clues. When the police informed the Ports that their
son was a murder suspect, they refused to allow the police to search
further. 2 When David returned home, he was arrested, but not before
speaking to his parents. Three days later, Bernard and Odette Port
were subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury investigating their
son for murder. Prosecutors wanted the parents to testify about their
conversations with and observations of David just before David was
arrested.3 The Ports refused to testify. "I've worked so hard to be a
father ...I just couldn't [testify]," said Bernard Port. 4 "A mother's
instinct is to protect. I would feel unnatural doing the opposite," 5
Odette Port added. The Ports were ultimately jailed for contempt of
court. Bernard Port spent approximately two months in jail. Odette
Port spent four.6
It may be startling to learn that the government can compel
testimony about communications and observations between parents
and their children. No intra-familial privilege shields parents or
children from prosecutorial reach. The absence of a parent-child
evidentiary privilege can lead to the kind of dilemma faced by David
Port's parents. 7 Forty-five states and the federal system do not
1. Aric Press & Roger Schulman, Parents, Children, and the Law, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27,
1984, at 81.
2. Peter Carlson, A Texas Murder Case Raises an Exquisite Question: Must Parents Testify
Against Their Child?, PEOPLE, Oct. 15, 1984, at 146.
3. Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423, 425 (5th Cir. 1985).
4. Press & Schulman, supra note 1, at 81 (internal quotation marks omitted).
5. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
6. See Sonia Live: Sins of the Children (CNN television broadcast Dec. 9, 1992)
(discussing David Port's case with guests, including the Ports' attorney, Randy Schaffer).
7. The Port case is not an aberration. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir.
1997) (involving a 1995 subpoena of a former FBI agent to testify about a conversation he had
with his eighteen-year-old son, who was the target of a grand jury investigation); Doug Most, A
Court Has EarsInside The Home; Parent-ChildSecrets Not Safe, RECORD, Dec. 7, 1997, at A01
(describing the subpoena of the parents of eighteen-year-old Amy Grossberg, charged with the
murder of her newborn baby, to testify about what their daughter had told them about the death of
her son); Police Talk to Dartmouth Suspects' Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2001, at A-28
(describing the parents of two teenagers charged with killing two Dartmouth college professors
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recognize an evidentiary parent-child privilege.8 Some parents
respond as the Ports did-willing to sacrifice their liberty for the
sake of their family. Others may choose a different path-to comply
with the law as currently written. 9
Compelling parents to testify against their minor children
unleashes a host of deeply rooted societal values. On the one hand,
there is the need to shield parent-child communications from
government compulsion in order to preserve familial integrity. On
the other hand, there is the need to ascertain all relevant evidence in a
criminal matter. The conflict is intensified in a political climate that
elevates family values while simultaneously prosecuting more
children as adults at ages younger than ever before. l"Congress has
never considered a parent-child privilege aimed exclusively at
shielding parents from testifying against their minor children and
agreeing to cooperate with investigators in turn for not having to testify before a grand jury);
Barry Siegel, Choosing Between Their Son and the Law, L.A. TIMES, June 13, 1996, at 1
(describing Arthur and Geneva Yandow's experience in jail after refusing to cooperate with a
subpoena to appear before a Vermont grand jury to testify against their twenty-five-year-old son).
8. The following states have some form of a parent-child privilege: CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 46b-138a (2007) (providing that a parent of a minor who is accused in a juvenile court matter
"may elect or refuse to testify for or against the accused child," except that the parent must testify
if he or she is the victim of violence allegedly inflicted by the child); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9203(7) (2004) (providing that parents or guardians "shall not be forced to disclose any
communication made by their minor child or ward to them concerning matters in any civil or
criminal action to which such child or ward is a party" unless the case involves violence by one
party against the other); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233 § 20 (2000) (providing that a minor
child may not be forced to testify against natural or adoptive parents in a grand-jury inquiry or
criminal proceeding, unless the victim is a member of the parent's family living in that parent's
house); MINN. STAT. § 595.020) (2008) (providing that a parent may not be compelled to testify
"as to any communication made in confidence by the minor to the minor's parent," except in
certain enumerated situations); People v. Fitzgerald, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 314 (N.Y. County Ct.
1979) (holding that parent-child privilege is applicable to any parent-child communication,
despite age of child, as long as the communication is made for the purpose of obtaining support,
guidance, or advice); In re A&M, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 381 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (finding that
New York has the only judicially recognized parent-child privilege, based upon the right to
privacy found in the State Constitution).
9. Note, Parent-Child Loyalty and Testimonial Privilege, 100 HARV. L. REV. 910, 921
(1987) (citing In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1326 (D. Nev. 1983) ("A society that values
parent-child relationships should not place parents and children in a 'psychological double-bind
in which [the witness] is scorned and branded as disloyal if he does testify and jailed if he does
not."')). This scenario has been referred to by some lawmakers as a cruel "trilemma" because a
third course of action contemplated by a parent who does not want to testify is to testify falsely.
See infra text accompanying note 228.
10. In 2004, 9,400 delinquency cases were waived to adult court, reflecting a 21 percent
increase from 2000 because of changes in states laws made during the 1990s. ANNE L. STAHL,
OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, FACT SHEET: DELINQUENCY
CASES IN JUVENILE COURT, 2004, at 2 (2008), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/
fs20080l.pdf.
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disclosing communications and observations between the two."
Lawmakers' failure to narrow the proposed parent-child privilege to
minor children is the primary reason a parent-child privilege is
recognized in only five states. 12
This Article proposes a parent-child privilege limited to
communications between parents and their minor children, and
parents' observations of their minor children. In an effort to refine
the debate over the recognition of a parent-child privilege, this
Article further limits its application to a single context: the
prosecution of a minor. 13The juvenile justice context best illustrates
the dichotomy in the handling of parent-child communications. Our
society encourages, in some instances even mandates, children to
communicate openly with their parents; at the same time, absent is
any legal protection of the information that is shared between parent
and child that would shield it from government compulsion.
Arguably, compelling the disclosure of parent-child communications
reveals the tension between the government's need for probative
evidence of a crime and respect for the unique role parents undertake
in the criminal cases against their children.
We do not know how often parents are compelled to testify
against their minor children. There are few reported cases on this
subject, and even fewer that specifically deal with parents who
testify against their minor children. One factor that contributes to the
paucity of reported decisions is that juvenile delinquency cases go to
trial and receive appellate review even less frequently than adult
prosecutions. 14 Second, juvenile proceedings are closed to the public,
11. The Parent-Child Privilege Act was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives in
1998, 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005. See H.R. 3433, 109th Cong. (2005) (proposing a parent-child
privilege which would apply in civil and criminal proceedings and would not distinguish between
minor children and adult children); H.R. 538, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 733, 107th Cong. (2001);
H.R. 522, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 3577, 105th Cong. (1998). So to all intents and purposes, the
proposed parent-child privilege would protect any communications made between parents and
their children, regardless of the age of the child. The criticism by members of Congress was that it
was overbroad. See infra Part VI.
12. See infra Part IV. A majority of lawmakers sympathetic to the concerns attached to
compelling parents to testify against their children agreed that the scope needed to be further
limited. Nevertheless, the legislative history reveals no meaningful attempt to draft legislation to
bring about large-scale support for a parent-child privilege.
13. The privilege would apply equally to a juvenile delinquency proceeding or a criminal
proceeding, as long as the defendant has not reached the age of majority.
14. See N. Lee Cooper, Patricia Puritz & Wendy Shang, Fulfilling the Promise of In re
Gault: Advancing the Role of Lawyers for Children, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 651, 674-75
(1998) (stating that relatively few juvenile delinquency cases are appealed in most jurisdictions);
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so information about the proceedings is more difficult to obtain. No
study has examined the frequency with which prosecutors compel
parents to testify against their children. Media accounts ,"can only
begin to reveal the circumstances under which this legal
phenomenon occurs. To gain a meaningful understanding of the legal
and social impact of the lack of a parent-child testimonial privilege,
it is important to identify the circumstances that would incline a
prosecutor to seek incriminating information from the parents of the
accused 16 Despite the lack of empirical data, courts and legislators
seem to believe that compelling parents to testify against their minor
children is so rare an event that, in essence, there is a de facto
privilege that protects the communications between parents and their
children. "7In fact, if the occurrence of this legal phenomenon is
indeed rare, " it suggests the presence of a social norm that lays bare
a deep-seated belief that parent-child confidentiality deserves
protection. A richer understanding of how this legal phenomenon is
viewed by prosecutors will add immeasurably to whether that
protection should be formalized by the adoption of an evidentiary
privilege.
This Article was inspired in part by Professor Catherine Ross's
invitation to scholars and practitioners to place the need for a parentchild evidentiary privilege within the context of the due process
rights of minors. 19 Professor Ross argues that the strongest case for a
testimonial privilege is when parents are subpoenaed to testify
against their minor child with whom they are living. "0Professor Ross
Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juveniles Courts a Breeding Ground for Wrongful
Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REv. 257, 294-99 (2007) (critiquing the lack of an appellate or post-

conviction practice in juvenile court).
15. E.g., Carlson, supra note 2.
16. The author has undertaken a research study that which examines prosecutorial attitudes
toward the use of state-compelled parental testimony in juvenile prosecutions.
17. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Unemancipated Minor Child, 949 F. Supp. 1487, 1491
(E.D. Wash. 1996) ("The court believes the paucity of authority on this topic may reflect a deepseated sense of respect for the family on the part of state and federal prosecutors.").
18. Consideration of this legal phenomenon should not be limited to instances where parents
have actually been subpoenaed by the prosecution. Simply knowing that a prosecutor can issue
such a subpoena can alter the way the accused minors, their parents, and their counsel make

decisions concerning the litigation.
19. Catherine Ross, Implementing Constitutional Rights for Juveniles: The Parent-Child
Privilege in Context, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 85 (2003).
20. Id. at 85-86 ("The case for a testimonial privilege is strongest in the case of a minor
child living with the parent who is the subject of a subpoena ad testificandum through which the
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terms this paradigm the "essential parent-child privilege."' 2' This
Article strives to meet Professor Ross's challenge and to go beyond
it by incorporating recent legal developments and scientific studies
that strengthen the case for an evidentiary privilege for parents and
their minor children. While some may argue that the proposed
privilege set forth in this Article does not extend far enough, it is the
opinion of this author that the first step toward the recognition of a
parent-child privilege is to craft a narrow privilege that responds to
legislative and judicial concerns that have caused prior proposals to
fail at both the national level and the state level.22 Courts and
lawmakers in some of the states that have rejected a parent-child
privilege on the grounds that the proposed privilege was too broad
have shown receptivity to an evidentiary privilege for minor children
and their parents. 23 The scenario that underlies the "essential parentchild privilege" is the strongest case for a parent-child privilege
because it implicates both the due process rights of minors and the
most compelling of the social policy interests at stake.
Part I provides a historical overview of privilege law in the
United States and compares the parent-child relationship to
relationships that are entirely protected by an evidentiary privilege.
Part II sets forth two constitutional arguments in favor of a parentchild privilege: the juveniles' right against self-incrimination and the
parents' right to maintain the care, custody, and control of their
children. Part III illustrates the importance of parent-child
communications in light of the legally recognized biological and
psycho-social differences between adolescents and adults. Part IV
explores prior efforts to codify a parent-child privilege at both the
state level and the federal level. Part V critiques the legal and
normative rationales that have been used to reject a parent-child
privilege. Finally, Part VI explores the antecedents in comparative
law traditions that specifically shield family members from acting as
witnesses against one another. Throughout this Article, the author
will offer her own insights and explanations as to why a parent-child
state seeks to compel the parent's testimony against the child. And yet most jurisdictions in the
United States do not recognize even a privilege that covers confidential communications from
minors to their parents.").
21. Id. at 95.

22. E.g., H.R. 3577, 105th Cong. (1998).
23. See infra Part IV.
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privilege has not gained traction in the United States despite earnest
attempts by academicians, legislators, judges, and advocacy groups
to have such a privilege adopted.
I. PRIVILEGE LAW: A HISTORICAL PRELUDE
Privileges are evidentiary rules that constrict the flow of
information to the trier of fact in order to advance substantive social
policies. 24 Two distinct ration ales for privileges have been advanced
since their inception. The most common rationale is the protection of
interests and relationships of such social worth that they justify the
sacrifice of available evidence relevant to the administration of
justice. 5 The relationships which fall under the rubric of the
evidentiary rules discussed in this Article are between attorney and
client, psychotherapist and patient, clergy and communicant, and
husband and wife. A second rationale for privileges advances a
theory that certain human relationships are so fundamentally private
that they warrant protection from interference regardless of whether
the privilege substantially affects conduct between the parties. 26 For
instance, communication between a husband and a wife may not be
induced by the existence of an evidentiary privilege. Nonetheless,
unflagging support for the privilege exists on the basis that it serves
to protect the essential privacy in the marital relationship. 27
Notwithstanding the rationales described above, evidentiary
privileges clash with the belief that the public has the right to "every
' ' Not surprisingly, the evidentiary privileges
man's evidence." 28
section of the Federal Rules of Evidence was among the most
controversial. 29 Rather than approving some or all of the proposed
privileges, Congress passed one rule, Federal Rule of Evidence

24. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1197 (6th ed. 1990).
25. JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 86 (5th ed. 2006).

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Wendy Meredith Watts, The Parent-ChildPrivileges: Hardly a New or Revolutionary
Concept, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 583, 586-87 (1987); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 674 (1972) (quoting In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297, 299 (Mass. 1971)).
29. Some members of the Advisory Committee to the Proposed Rules of Evidence
disapproved of broad evidentiary privileges such as husband-wife and doctor-patient privileges.
Judge Jack Weinstein, a committee member, referred to evidentiary privileges as "hindrances
which should be curtailed." EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE 153 (2002)

(quoting Judge Weinstein).
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which abdicates the recognition of evidentiary privileges to
the courts. Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 501 states that courts
should recognize privileges under the common law "as they may be
interpreted ... in the light of reason and experience."31 Today, most
of those proposed privileges are recognized by federal common law
and state statutes.32 Privileges can act as disqualifications, which
exempt the witness from testifying altogether.33 The majority of
evidentiary privileges do not completely bar the witness from
testifying; instead, they act to exclude certain types of evidence, such
as communications. " A privilege protecting a communication
between persons simply means that a Witness cannot be compelled to
testify about the content of the communications but may be required
to testify about other relevant evidence. " Evidentiary privileges in
American law can be divided into two categories: professional and
personal. Regardless of classification, every privilege applies to
relationships characterized by trust and confidentiality. 36 The
privileges recognized by the federal courts are the attorney-client
privilege, the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the clergycommunicant privilege, and the spousal privileges.37 This section
begins with a discussion of the professional privileges in an effort to
focus the reader on the multifaceted role of parents in the prosecution
of their children. The premise of this Article is that because the
prosecution of children requires parents to act in ways that are
associated with legal and mental health professionals, the law should
extend to parents the same privilege it provides to lawyers,
501,30

30. FED. R. EVID. 501.
31. Id.
32. E.g., CAL. EvID. CODE § 970 (West 2009). Other privileges, such as the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination and the privilege for governmental information will not be
discussed with the same detail because they are beyond the scope of this Article.
33. See, e.g., STRONG, supra note 25, § 78. When first established, the adverse spousal
testimonial privilege disqualified and prevented one spouse from testifying either for or against
the other spouse in a criminal or civil matter. Id. Over time, the common law rule has been
modified such that both spouses are fully competent to testify, but in a criminal proceeding the
prosecution may not call one spouse without the accused spouse's consent. E.g., CAL. EvID.

CODE § 970.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 763 F.2d 778, 783 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating that the
federal common law marital communications privilege applies only to communications).
35. Id.
36. STRONG, supra note 25, § 86.
37. See generally Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (describing the different types of
privileges recognized by federal courts).
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psychotherapists, and other professionals covered by an evidentiary
privilege. The spousal privilege can be characterized as a personal
privilege, which exists to preserve the sanctity of the marital
relationship, 3' as well as the social norm against convicting
defendants based upon the testimony of their life partners. 39 Obvious
comparisons exist between the marital privilege and a parent-child
privilege and are fully explored following the discussion of the
existing professional privileges.
A. Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is one of the most sanctified
professional privileges recognized by law. The societal interest at the
core of the attorney-client privilege is to provide clients with a
trusting and confidential relationship when they seek legal
assistance. " The purpose of the privilege is even broader than
concerns over self-incrimination; it exists so that no barriers can get
in the way of clients' full and frank disclosure of any type of
information to their lawyers that is relevant to the attorney-client
relationship, even information containing no wrongdoing
whatsoever. "
Clients consult attorneys for a wide variety of reasons, only
one of which involves possible criminal liability. Many
attorneys act as counselors on personal and family matters,
where, in the course of obtaining the desired advice,
confidences about family members or financial problems
must be revealed in order to assure sound legal advice. 42
The absence of an attorney-client privilege would erode the
integrity of the legal profession and undermine the premise that
candor is essential to acquire the best legal advice. By the nature of
the profession, there will be instances where lawyers are in
possession of valuable information pertaining to an investigation or a

38. STRONG, supra note 25, § 86.
39.

JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE tN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 216-17 (McNaughton

rev. 1981) (1961).
40. The privilege is intended to encourage "full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration ofjustice." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
41. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 407-08 (1998).
42. Id.
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lawsuit.4 3 The privilege may be invoked despite the type of
proceeding, criminal or civil,' because in either forum, the social
cost incurred by the disclosure is greater than the benefit gained by
its revelation.
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Swidler & Berlin v.
United States45 reveals the judiciary's respect for the attorney-client
privilege. The Swidler Court held that the attorney-client privilege
survives the death of the client.46 Underlying the Court's decision
was the recognition that the concerns clients may have about
information being disclosed during their lifetimes exist
posthumously.47 The demise of one's reputation, potential civil
liability, and possible harm to friends and relatives do not cease upon
death. 48 The Court observed that if confidentiality was not assured
posthumously, the client in Swidler may well not have made
disclosures to his attorney. " Swidler demonstrates an extraordinary
commitment to ensuring that lawyers do not incriminate their clients,
both during their clients' lifetimes and afterwards. Except for certain
circumstances, the client is the only person who can waive the
attorney-client privilege.
B. Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege
The last time the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a new
privilege was in 1996 when it determined that confidential
communications between patients and their psychotherapists,
including social workers, were to be protected from involuntary
disclosure.5 ° Jaffee v. Redmond concerned the disclosure of
statements that a police officer made to her licensed social worker
43. See, e.g., id. (denying government lawyers' request for a criminal case exception to
posthumous application of attorney-client privilege).
44. E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 910 (West 2009) ("[T]he provisions of this division apply to all
proceedings.").
45. 524 U.S. 399.
46. Id. at 407.

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 408. When the U.S. Supreme Court was considering whether to limit the
posthumous privilege between attorneys and clients, it sought empirical evidence to gauge
whether limiting the privilege to the client's lifetime would reduce candor between lawyer and
client. The empirical data was scarce and inconclusive. Nevertheless, the Court declined to limit
the privilege. Id. at 409.
50. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996).
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during psychotherapy sessions following an incident where the
officer shot and killed a man while on duty.51 Police officer Mary Lu
Redmond, and the department she worked for at the time, were sued
under the federal civil rights statute after Redmond killed the
plaintiff. 52 In the course of the litigation, the plaintiff sought the
notes of a clinical social worker which were taken during her
counseling sessions with Redmond. " The defendant urged the Court
to continue the evolutionary development of evidentiary privileges
according to Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and recognize a privilege
for communications between psychotherapists and their patients. 4
Resting on the belief that protecting the communications
between psychotherapists and their patients promotes sufficiently
important social interests, the Court continued the expansion of
common law privileges under FRE 501. The professional ethics of
psychotherapists require confidentiality, yielding only to the law. 5
At the heart of the psychotherapist-patient relationship is a
commitment to trust and privacy that if eroded, harms the patient and
threatens the integrity of the profession. Many patients divulge
intimate details of their personal relationships, habits, and
professional conduct to their therapists that patients would never
reveal without an assurance of confidentiality. "6From a professional
standpoint, without a guarantee to patients that their communication
will be confidential, the therapists' role is compromised. Were there
no privilege, patients, for fear of disclosure, might not be completely
honest with their therapists, undermining the therapists' ability to
treat their patients. " Moreover, patients might opt out of therapy
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.

55.

AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS

AND CODE OF CONDUCT 4.01 (2002), available at http://www.apa.org/ethics/code2002.pdf.
56. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12.
57. Id. at 10-11.
[T]he mere possibility of disclosure may impede development of the confidential
relationship necessary for successful treatment. As the Judicial Conference Advisory

Committee observed in 1972 when it recommended that Congress recognize a
psychotherapist privilege as part of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, a
psychiatrist's ability to help her patients 'is completely dependent upon [the patients']
willingness and ability to talk freely. This makes it difficult if not impossible for [a
psychiatrist] to function without being able to assure.., patients of confidentiality and,
indeed, privileged communication. Where there may be exceptions to this general
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altogether because they are concerned that their confidences may be
revealed.
As with any privilege recognized under law, the value of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege has been determined to outweigh
the costs incurred by its existence. Predictably, the social worth of
dispensing mental health counseling to those who seek it is
determined to be greater than a third party's interest in seeking
psychotherapist-patient communications and patient records. 8 Jaffee
is the most recent proclamation by the Court that the evolutionary
development of privileges is guided by reason and experience.
C. Clergy-CommunicantPrivilege

The clergy-communicant privilege, sometimes termed the priestpenitent privilege, was unknown in common law but is now
recognized in all fifty states and the District of Columbia.59 The
privilege excuses clergymen from testifying in judicial proceedings
regarding communications shared with them by penitents seeking
spiritual advice or the chance to confess. 6 The qualification to be
considered in the class of "clergy" according to the statutes depends
on one's role and purpose within the denomination. 6 The traditional
rule..., there is wide agreement that confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful
psychiatric treatment.'
Id. at 10-11 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Rules,
56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1972)).
58. Id. at 11.
This case amply demonstrates the importance of allowing individuals to receive
confidential counseling. Police officers engaged in the dangerous and difficult tasks
associated with protecting the safety of our communities not only confront the risk of
physical harm but also face stressful circumstances that may give rise to anxiety,
depression, fear, or anger. The entire community may suffer if police officers are not
able to receive effective counseling and treatment after traumatic incidents, either
because trained officers leave the profession prematurely or because those in need of
treatment remain on the job.
Id. at 11 n.10.
59. 2 ScoTt N. STONE & ROBERT K. TAYLOR, TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 6.04 (2d ed.
1995) ("[A] person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent another from disclosing a
confidential communication by the person to a clergyman in his professional character as spiritual
advisor.") (quoting Proposed FED. R. EVID. 506(b)); see also, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE. § 1033
(West 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(c) (2008); FLA. STAT. § 90.505 (2009); 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. § 518-803 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 9-111 (West 2002).
60. Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, Subject Matter and Waiver of Privilege Covering
Communications to Clergy Member or SpiritualAdvisor, 93 A.L.R. 5th 327, 358-53 (2001).
61. While the proposed federal rule defined a clergyman as "a minister, priest, rabbi, or other
similar functionary of a religious organization, or an individual reasonably believed so to be by
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view has been that only priests and ministers of conventional
churches may be protected by this testimonial privilege.62 The
modem trend is to recognize anyone who serves as a "spiritual
representative" for a denomination as a member of the "clergy." 6 3 As
a result, some courts have held that the clergy-communicant
privilege applies to elders, 64 nuns, and part-time preachers. 66
Legal recognition of a clergy-communicant testimonial privilege
is an endorsement of the need to protect the privacy of spiritual
counseling. There is a natural repugnance toward compelling a
member of the cloth to divulge communications made by persons
seeking spiritual guidance. 67 Every state legislature and Congress
have reached the same conclusion: the public interest in preserving
the privacy of the clergy-communicant relationship outweighs the
need to elicit evidence important to the judicial process. The
inviolability
of
priest-penitent
communications
is
an
acknowledgment of the importance of the religious community's role
in the well-being of its members. Justice Warren E. Burger offered
his view on the spiritual counseling privilege when he wrote, "The
priest-penitent privilege recognizes the human need to disclose to a
spiritual counselor, in total and absolute confidence, what are
believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly
consolation and guidance in return." 68

the person consulting him," id. (quoting Proposed FED. R. EVID. 506(a)(1)), states vary as to what
they consider to be a "clergyman." See infra Part I.C.
62. In re Swenson, 237 N.W. 589, 590 (Minn. 1931) (refuting the idea that only priests are
protected by the privilege).
63. Id.
64. Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 161 N.W. 290, 293 (Iowa 1917).
65. Eckmann v. Bd. of Educ. of Hawthorne Sch. Dist., 106 F.R.D. 70, 72-73 (E.D. Mo.
1985) (holding that a nun's performance of priestly functions recognized by the Catholic Church
and her position as spiritual advisor were sufficient to invoke the privilege).
66. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 4-06(a)(1), at 95 (1969) ("However, [the
privilege] is not so broad as to include all self-denominated 'ministers.' A fair construction of the
language requires that the person to whom the status is sought to be attached be regularly engaged
in activities conforming at least in a general way with those of a Catholic priest, Jewish rabbi, or

minister of an established Protestant denomination, though not necessarily on a full-time basis.").
67. See Watts, supra note 28, at 596.

68. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,51(1980).
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D. Spousal Privileges

The law recognizes the personal privilege for spouses to
preserve

the marital

harmony that would

be

threatened by

compelling an unwilling spouse to testify against the other. 69 Marital
privileges have a long tradition that favors their recognition. Jewish
law and Roman law expressly prohibit a family member from
testifying against another family member. 70 At common law, the
marital privilege originated with the view that a husband and a wife
were recognized as one legal person. 71 Today, common law and state
statutes create two distinct marital privileges: the adverse spousal

testimonial privilege and the marital confidential communications
privilege. The adverse spousal testimonial privilege is recognized by
federal law, thirty states, and the District of Columbia." This

privilege is applicable when one spouse is the defendant and the
testimony sought from the other spouse is adverse to the defendant. "
The adverse spousal testimonial privilege can only be asserted during
the marriage, and may relate to events that took place before the
marriage. 7 4 Different jurisdictions apply the spousal immunity in
various ways. A majority of jurisdictions apply the adverse spousal

69. See id. at 52.
70. W.A. HUNTER, A SYSTEMATIC AND HISTORICAL EXPOSITION OF ROMAN LAW 1056
(Win. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc. 4th ed. 1992) (1876); Erica Smith-Klocek, A Halachic Perspective
on the Parent-ChildPrivilege, 39 CATH. LAW. 105, 109 (1999).
71. In the seventeenth century, Lord Coke wrote that a wife could not testify either for or
against her husband because they are two souls in one body. SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST
PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR, A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON
§ 6b (1628). The English Act of 1853 abolished the disqualification of husband and wife as
witnesses and replaced it with a privilege protecting communications made between husband and
wife during marriage. STRONG, supra note 25, at 126-27.
72. See e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2231 (2003) (civil); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134062 (2003) (criminal); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (2008); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-306(a)
(2001); KY. R. EVID. 504(a); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-106 (West 2002); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2162 (2008) (civil); MINN.
STAT. § 595.02(l)(a) (2008); MiSS. R. EVID. 601; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-505(2) (2009); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5923 (West 2000) (civil); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (2009); WYO.
STAT. ANN. §§ 1-12-101,-04 (2009).
73. When a criminal defendant seeks favorable testimony from a spouse and the spouse is
unwilling to testify, a contest ensues between an evidentiary privilege and the Sixth Amendment
right of the accused under the Compulsory Process Clause. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14,23 (1967).
74. An adverse spousal testimonial privilege irohibits a spouse from testifying before a
tribunal or a grand jury, but it does not prevent the government from enlisting a spouse to provide
information informally to the government in mounting evidence against the defendant spouse.
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testimonial privilege only in criminal proceedings. " Ten of the states
with the adverse spousal testimonial privilege allow either the
witness spouse or the defendant spouse to assert the privilege. 76
At early common law, the adverse spousal testimonial privilege
vested with the defendant spouse, allowing the defendant to preempt
the testimony of the witness spouse. " In Trammel v. United States,7
the willingness of the wife to testify against her husband prompted
the U.S. Supreme Court to reconsider whether the privilege should
be vested solely with the defendant spouse; the Court reasoned that if
the witness spouse wanted to testify, there was no spousal harmony
left to protect. " Elizabeth and Edwin Trammel, husband and wife,
conspired to import heroin into the United States. " When Elizabeth
Trammel was arrested during an airport customs search, she
immediately agreed to cooperate with the government in exchange
for a grant of immunity. 8 By the time of the trial, the dissolution of
the Trammel marriage was well underway. At trial, Edwin Trammel
objected to his wife's testimony against him on the grounds that the
adverse spousal testimonial privilege barred her from doing so. 82 The
lower court affirmed the existing rule and precluded Elizabeth
Trammel from testifying.83 Breaking with precedent, the Supreme
Court unanimously held that the existing rule, which permitted
someone other than the witness spouse to assert the privilege,
contravened public policy. 84 As Chief Justice Burger explained,

75. Thirteen states and the District of Columbia recognize an adverse spousal testimonial
privilege in both criminal and civil cases. See, e.g., ALASKA R. EVID. 505(a); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-2231 (2003) (civil); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 13-4062 (2003) (criminal); CAL. EVID.
CODE §§ 970-973 (West 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (2008); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14306(a) (2001); KY. R. EVID. 504(a); MINN. STAT. § 595.02 (1)(a) (2008).
76. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2231 (2003) (civil); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4062
(2003) (criminal); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (2008); KY. R. EViD. 504(a); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 600.2162 (2008) (civil); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(l)(a) (2008); MISS. R. EVID. 601; NEB.
REV. STAT. § 27-505(2) (2009); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5924 (West 2000) (civil); WASH.
REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-12-101,-04 (2009).
77. See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 76 (1958).
78. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
79. Id. at 52.
80. Id. at 42.
81. Id.

82. Id.
83. Id. at 43.
84. Id. at 52-53.
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When one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a
criminal proceeding-whatever the motivation-their
relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there is
probably little in the way of marital harmony for the
privilege to preserve. In these circumstances, a rule of
evidence that permits an accused to prevent adverse
testimony seems far more likely to frustrate justice than to
foster family peace. "
The second type of spousal privilege is the marital confidential
communications privilege. The marital confidential communications
privilege permits either spouse to refuse to reveal, and prevents the
other spouse from revealing, the substance of communications made
between spouses during their marriage. 86 The privilege can be
asserted by either spouse in a civil or criminal proceeding, without
regard to whether the spouse asserting the privilege is a party to the
proceeding. 87 The widely accepted rationale for this privilege is to
promote free and open communication between spouses. In the midnineteenth century, legal experts opined that human happiness
depended largely on the inviolability of domestic confidence.
Experts felt that
the alarm and unhappiness occasioned to society by
invading its sanctity and compelling the public disclosures
of confidential communications between husband and wife
would be a far greater evil than the disadvantages which
may occasionally arise from the loss of light which such
revelations might throw on questions in dispute. 88

85. Id. at 52.
86. See Blau v. United States 340, U.S. 332, 333-34 (1951). All fifty states and the District
of Columbia recognize a marital confidential communications privilege. GEORGE FISHER,
EVIDENCE 839 (2002). Eight states treat marital confidential communications testimony as a
disqualification rather than a privilege. A disqualifying privilege exempts the witness from
testifying altogether. Five states grant the witness spouse the ability to assert the privilege. See
IND. CODE § 34-46-3-1 (West 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2162 (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 8-56, 8-57 (2009); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5914 (West 2000) (criminal); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5923 (West 2000) (civil); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-30 (2008).
87. The marital confidential communications privilege does not authorize either spouse to
refuse to testify against the other; it simply protects confidential communications between
spouses.
88. FISHER, supra note 85, at 840 (quoting COMMISSIONERS ON COMMON LAW
PROCEDURE, SECOND REPORT 13 (1853)); see 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 2332, at 636 (4th ed. 1961).
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E. The Parent-ChildPrivilegeand
Existing Privileges:A Comparison
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 acknowledges the authority of
federal courts to continue to develop evidentiary privileges in federal
criminal trials is "governed by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted ... in the light of reason and experience."89
The last common law privilege to be recognized under FRE 501
protects communications between patients and their psychotherapists
from involuntary disclosure. 9 The U.S. Supreme Court has denied
certiorari in four cases that could have sanctioned a parent-child
privilege under FRE 501.9"
Lawmakers and judges argue that the relationships deserving an
evidentiary privilege are integral to our society, and the law must
protect them by ensuring confidentiality. In light of society's
expectations of parents and the nature of delinquency proceedings,
parents are uniquely positioned to act in both a professional and a
personal capacity when a child discloses incriminating information to
them. Parents provide guidance and advice that closely parallels, but
in importance often surpasses, the role of an attorney,
psychotherapist, or spiritual counselor. Parents typically are the first
responders to their child's dilemma. Even before an attorney
intervenes on the child's behalf, parents are often the first to assess
the need for counsel (or other professional services) based on the
information provided by the child. Parents typically have substantial
access to their child, gather the most information from their child,
and are able to provide the most financial, emotional, and intellectual
support to their child. Open and confidential communication is
essential if parents are to meaningfully assess their child's dilemma
and make informed decisions about appropriate actions to take.

89. FED. R. EVID. 501; see also Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47.
90. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996).
91. See In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1253 (1997); Grand
Jury Proceedings of John Doe v. United States, 842 F.2d 244 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
894 (1988); United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1008 (1985);
Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203 (Mass. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068
(1984). But see In re A Grand Jury Subpoena, 722 N.E.2d 450, 457 n.15 (Mass. 2000) (noting
that the privilege against self-incrimination or the right to counsel may be implicated if a parent
advising a juvenile about the exercise or waiver of rights is compelled to answer questions about
the content of those conversations).
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Distinct from the adult criminal justice system, the juvenile
justice system depends on the engagement of parents to assist their
children as they navigate through a complicated and potentially
punitive system. Parents are the conduits through which
professionals will be retained to assist their child. Accurate and
truthful information from the child better equips the parents to seek
the appropriate services. Children do not assume this role for
themselves, nor should they be expected to do so. Children may be
targets of criminal investigations, but rarely will they have the
foresight, knowledge, and resources to seek assistance, legal or
otherwise, without assistance from their parents or guardian. In
conferring with professionals such as lawyers, doctors, and
therapists, children are not particularly good self-reporters-they
tend to omit details and their descriptions lack detail (particularly
legally relevant information). 92 Parents are often the ones who
provide the details and fill in the gaps necessary for the professional
to gain a full understanding of the child. Parents assume the financial
responsibility for the professional services rendered on behalf of
their child. " It is not uncommon for parents to consult directly with
the professional, such as the lawyer, they are contemplating hiring.
In light of the absence of a parent-child privilege, professionals may
not be able to share as much information with parents as they would
like (and children may want them to).94 This is an unnecessary
dilemma if all parties involved want full disclosure so that parents
can provide the utmost emotional, intellectual, and financial support
to their child.
In the juvenile justice system, the functions performed by
parents overlap in many respects with those performed by an
attorney. Parents routinely function as counselors to their children,
helping them to navigate the legal terrain and assisting in the legal

92. See Barry Feld, Juveniles' Waiver of Legal Rights: Confessions, Miranda, and Right to
Counsel, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 105

(Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000); Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The
Evolution of Adolescence: A DevelopmentalPerspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 160-64 (1997).

93. The parents' responsibility differs from that of adult clients, who may seek guidance
from any number of sources and are solely responsible for the costs they incur.
94. A parent should not obtain access to information pertaining to the representation of the
parent's minor child unless the child consents to such access and the child's attorney determines
that it is in the best legal interest of the child to disclose the information to the child's parent.
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decision making. In many instances, children waive their right to
counsel. Moreover, parents, satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily, perform
many of the functions that would otherwise be fulfilled by a
lawyer.9 Empirical research indicates that when parents do not feel
that the circumstances warrant retaining a lawyer for their children,
children overwhelmingly waive counsel.96 The need for a parentchild privilege is evidenced in the large number of parents serving as
de facto lawyers to their children.
With or without a lawyer, the parents' role in legal decision
making cannot be overstated. The onerous task of weighing options
and considering the long-term consequences of one's decisions is
beyond the capacity of most adolescents." 7 Lawyers advise their
clients of the law and the legal consequences of their decisions, but
the clients ultimately make the decisions. " Some lawyers tell their
clients which choice they think is best, but critical decisions, such as
whether to accept a plea offer and whether to testify at trial reside
solely with the clients. 99 Besides the child, the persons who wield the
most influence in the decision-making process are, most often, the
parents. Unlike the lawyer, parents are not bound by ethical
constraints that may limit the degree to which parents may influence
their child's decisions. Rightly or wrongly, many parents have been
telling their children what to do for most of their lives. To suddenly
stop when their child faces a possible loss of liberty seems ill95. Waiver of counsel among juveniles is significantly higher than among their adult
counterparts. One third of public defender offices surveyed in a 1993 national study on the issues
pertaining to juvenile representation reported that some percentage of youth waive their right to
counsel at the detention hearing. Twenty-one percent say it happens 1 to 10 percent of the time,
whereas 4 percent of respondents said it happens 51 to 80 percent of the time. See ABA JUVENILE
JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND
QUALITY OF

REPRESENTATION

IN DELINQUENCY

PROCEEDINGS

44 (2002), available at

http://www.njdc.info/pdf/cfjfull.pdf [hereinafter ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., A CALL
FOR JUSTICE]. In a 2002 indigent juvenile defense assessment, experts estimated that in one
county in Virginia, 50 percent of youth waived counsel regardless of the seriousness of the
offense. See ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., VIRGINIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO
COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 23-24 (2002).
96. Donna Bishop & Hillary Farber, Joining the Legal Significance of Adolescent
Developmental Capacities with the Legal Rights Provided by In re Gault, 60 RUTGERS L. REV.
125, 146-47 (2007) (discussing parental influence on child's decision to waive Miranda rights);
see also ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., A CALL FOR JUSTICE, supra note 95, at 45.
97. Adolescents tend to focus on the immediate, short-term consequences, not the long-term
ramifications, of their decisions. See infra Part III.
98. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007).
99. See id.
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advised and unlikely. Naturally, if parents are not informed of all the
relevant information, the efficacy of the parents' intervention is
threatened. Indeed, uninformed parents may give poor advice based
on a lack of information and a misunderstanding about the
culpability of their child.
There are two ways for parents to obtain the information they
need to advise and support their child in the legal case against the
child. One way is for the child to tell the parents what occurred and
hope that the government will never seek to access the content of
their communication. The other means is for the child to consent to
the lawyer's disclosure to the parents. The child's consent is also a
waiver of the attorney-client privilege with respect to the information
provided by the attorney to the parents because the information has
been disclosed to third parties who are not covered by any existing
privilege. At present, there are no means to prevent the government
from compelling parents to disclose statements of their child in either
scenario. In light of the similarities and shared responsibilities
between the child's lawyer and the parents, the denial of a parentchild privilege is akin to effacing a child's right against selfincrimination.
The virtue of a psychotherapist-patient testimonial privilege is
that patients will reveal honest and accurate information to their
therapists without fear of incrimination. Children share some of the
most personal information with their parents in order to receive the
benefit of their parents' counsel. The most reliable advice and
guidance are imparted by parents to their children based on truthful
and accurate information. 100 There is a subjective expectation of
privacy that information shared solely between parents and their
children will be kept confidential. For many, the fact that the
information shared between parents and their children is not
protected from government compulsion would be a revelation.
Therapists do not have to be concerned with the dilemma of
choosing between loyalty to their patients and an obligation to assist
law enforcement. A duty of loyalty to their child can cause a serious
dilemma for parents in response to any legal requirement that parents
divulge information harmful to their child. 101 In Jaffee, Justice
100. Due to the personal nature of their relationship, parents commonly offer unsolicited
advice to their children out of a sense of moral and social responsibility.
101. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 7.
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Antonin Scalia asked an empirical question (and answered it
unempirically) concerning the benefits of seeking advice from one's
mother: "Ask the average citizen: Would your mental health be more
significantly impaired by preventing you from seeing a
psychotherapist, or by preventing you from getting advice from your
mom? I have little doubt what the answer would be." 102 Justice
Scalia's remark underscores the necessity of parent-child
communication, particularly as it applies to minors. One way to
undermine the trust and confidence essential to the parent-child
relationship is to force parents to testify against their children.
Society places a premium on parental communication, awareness,
and time spent with children. The absence of legal protection for
parent-child communications and observations is inconsistent with
society's expectations of parents. 103
Personal privileges exist to respect and preserve the
relationships they embody. "0Such is the rationale underlying the
spousal privilege, adopted in all fifty states and the federal common
law. The parent-child relationship is an intimate, personal
relationship. In most instances, the parent-child relationship is
interminable. Short of rare instances of emancipation, there is no
formal dissolution of a parent-child relationship comparable to the
dissolution of marital unions. 105 The most compelling scenario
supporting a parent-child privilege is one in which the parent-child
relationship is intact both at the time the communication is made, and
when the parent is compelled to adversely testify against the child.
This is referred to as the "essential parent-child privilege." 106 A
strong, resilient parent-child relationship stands in stark contrast to a

102. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 22 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103. Parents' rights may be invoked in such instances because the absence of a legal privilege
has the potential to interfere with the parents' right to raise their children as they see fit.
104. See, e.g., STRONG, supra note 25, § 72.
105. According to the 2000 census, 41.5 percent of first marriages in the United States end in
divorce. See CENTER FOR MARRIAGE AND FAMILIES AT THE INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN VALUES,
U.S. MARRIAGE INDEX 1970-2000, http://www.americanvalues.org/center/wp-content/themes/
centerl/images/marriagejndex large.jpg (last visited Feb. 27, 2010). Of those first marriages
ending in divorce, the median duration of a marriage was less than nine years. Studies indicate
that the median duration of second marriages is less than eight years. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
TABLE 6. MEDIAN DURATION OF MARRIAGES FOR PEOPLE 15 YEARS AND OVER BY SEX, RACE,
AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2004 (2007), available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/
marital-hist/2004/Table6.2004.xls.
106. See Ross, supra note 19.
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dissolving marriage. Logically, there is no fair and just rationale for
extending a testimonial privilege to spouses, while denying parents
the right to claim a privilege to protect their children. ,07 One
commentator explained the similarity between the marital and
parent-child privileges as follows:
The child-parent relationship resembles the husband-wife
relationship in that both involve a fundamental and private
family bond. The child-parent relationship ideally
encompasses aspects found in the marital relationshipmutual love, intimacy and trust.... The fact that the childparent relationship is part of the institution of the family
that it is hoped is promoted by a marital privilege makes the
protection of children's private conversations with parents
even more appealing. 108
Implicitly, societal values are reflected in how the law regards
particular relationships. Legal protections such as evidentiary
privileges are an expression of the societal worth of the relationships
they protect. Over the past decade, the social and political agenda
revitalized family values. Nothing could be more antithetical to
preserving the family unit than compelling unwilling parents to
testify against their minor children. Also potentially damaging to
familial relations are police initiatives that seek the cooperation of
parents to root out information and gather incriminating evidence
about their children. Initiatives conceived by the Boston and
Washington, D.C., police departments that enlist parents to search
their children's bedrooms, looking for firearms and evidence of other
illegal activity have the deleterious effect of splintering families. 09
107. In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1325 (D. Nev. 1983) ("There is no reasonable basis for
extending a testimonial privilege for confidential communications to spouses, who enjoy a
dissoluble legal contract, while yet denying a parent or child the right to claim such a privilege to
protect communications made within an indissoluble family unit, bonded by blood, affection,
loyalty and tradition ....
[I]f the rationale behind the privilege of a witness-spouse to refuse to
testify adversely against his or her spouse in a criminal proceeding serves to prevent the invasion
of the harmony and privacy of the marriage relationship itself, then affording the same protection
to the parent-child relationship is even more compelling.").
108. Nissa M. Ricafort, Jaffee v. Redmond: The Supreme Court's DramaticShift Supports the
Recognition of a Federal Parent-ChildPrivilege, 32 IND. L. REv. 259, 289 (1998) (quoting Ann
M. Stanton, Child-Parent Privilege for Confidential Communications: An Examination and
Proposal,16 FAM L.Q. 1, 6-7 (1982)).
109. Hillary B. Farber, Editorial, Safe Homes' Inherent Perils, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 23,
2008, at 16. The Safe Homes Program is an initiative of the Boston Police Department to remove
guns from homes where juveniles may be concealing them. The design is for police to make
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Parents could quite easily misunderstand that the promise of
immunity as it relates to the recovery of a firearm, includes an
implied promise of confidentiality for all the information the parents
shares with the police in the privacy of their own home. But in fact,
information the police obtain from parents and other household
members during a Safe Homes visit unrelated to the concealed
firearm is compellable, including the communications between
parents and their children and parents' observations of their minor
children. ,,0
Legislators, prosecutors, defense lawyers, parents, and children
have commented on the family dilemma that will be precipitated by
forcing parents to incriminate their children. "' When all of this is
balanced against law enforcement's need for evidence, the argument
favoring a parent-child privilege is as strong, if not more compelling,
than the privileges already recognized by law.
F. The Wigmore Factors

Dean Wigmore devised a test for determining whether
communications within a particular relationship are worthy of an
evidentiary privilege. 112 The Wigmore test has four fundamental
conditions, all of which must be met to establish a privilege. 13
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between
the parties.
unannounced visits to homes they believe have guns and request permission from parents to
search the juveniles' bedroom. Allison Klein, D.C. Seeks Consent to Search for Guns; Amnesty
Offeredfor Access to Homes, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2008, at B 1.
110. Klein, supra note 109.
111. Massachusetts State Senator Cynthia Creem told the Christian Science Monitor, "We
would hope that if children came to their parents, they would be able to share their problems....
[But currently], if my children come to me, I have to say, 'Go talk to your priest, go talk to your
doctor, because I can't hear it."' Kris Axtman, Do Parents Belong on the Witness Stand?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 17, 2000, at 1. A Boston family lawyer said, "Your heart really
goes out to a parent whose child went to them in confidence to bear [sic] their soul. The last thing
on a parent's mind is, 'Jeez, I may be subpoenaed.' Your first reaction is, 'How can I help this
child that I love?"' Sacha Pfeiffer, Case Sparks Bill on Parent-Child Confidentiality Measure,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 6, 2000, at B 1.
112. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285 (John T.
McNaughton rev., Little Brown and Co. 1904).
113. Id.
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(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communications must be greater than
the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of
litigation. 114
When considering any of these prongs in the context of the juvenile
justice system, government maneuvers that cause fragmentation to
the family unit are antithetical to the mission of the juvenile court.
The juvenile court places the utmost importance on the family to
provide the structure, guidance and support needed for juveniles to
emerge from the delinquency experience with vastly more potential
to become productive members of society. 15 In a juvenile
delinquency prosecution, normative arguments supplanting the
importance of the family unit-specifically the relationship between
parents and children-in favor of law enforcement pursuits
contravene the purpose and design of the juvenile court. A legal
scheme that allows prosecutors to exercise discretion that is not
subject to review on matters as monumental as compelling parents to
testify against their children fails to attribute the proper weight to
familial relations and the well-being of children, the core principles
of the juvenile justice system. 116
The adult criminal justice system has a different philosophy than
does the juvenile justice system. The mission of the criminal justice
system is to prosecute alleged violations of the law and mete out
appropriate punishment. "' The criminal justice system's broader aim
is to prevent injury and harm to the general public. This it
accomplishes by punishing those who violate the penal laws and by
deterring those who would otherwise do harm. Retributive theories
114. Id.
115. JOHN WATKINS, JR., THE JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTURY 49-50 (1998).
116. See In re Agosto, 533 F. Supp. 1298, 1326 (D. Nev. 1983) ("The family, as the basic unit
of American society, is the milieu in which such values are inculcated into individuals, and thus
into society as a whole. Consequently, the child learns to relate to society and have respect for
society within the initial framework of his own relationship to his parents and other family
members. To damage the parent-child relationship would result in damage to the child's
relationship to society as a whole.").
117. 47 AM. JUR. 2D Juvenile Courts § 4 (2009) ("As juvenile court proceedings are designed
for the rehabilitation of minors, while the purpose of imprisonment pursuant to the criminal law is
punishment, the differing needs and characteristics of adult offenders and juveniles justify the
maintenance of a separate and distinct system ofjustice for each of the two classes.").
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that favor bringing an accused to justice, even if it may have a
deleterious effect on the family of the accused, are acceptable means
of fulfilling the purpose of criminal prosecution. "' Adhering to the
core philosophy of the juvenile court, parents should be empowered
to assist their children in positive ways, and forcing parents to
provide the government with inculpatory evidence against their
children contravenes this philosophy.
II. THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM'S DESIGN
AND PHILOSOPHY NECESSITATES RECOGNITION
OF A PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE

The progressive juvenile reformers of the late nineteenth century
brought wholesale change to the way the legal system had previously
dealt with children accused of breaking the law. Established in 1899,
the first juvenile court was founded in Chicago, Illinois, with the
purpose of providing treatment and rehabilitation to wayward youth
through a judicial system separate from its adult counterparts. The
court assumed a parental role and was designed specifically to act in
the best interest of the children who appeared before the court. This
was known as the doctrine of parens patriae.19 Judges treated
juveniles who came before them as sons and daughters in need of
guidance. 120 Juvenile court judges rarely appointed lawyers for youth
and discouraged parents from retaining counsel. 121 There was little
concern about protecting children from erroneous adjudications of
delinquency because the upshot of such an error would presumably
be the delivery of much needed services to these children. The
proceedings were considered civil rather than criminal, so due
process protections did not apply to the proceedings. Terminology
associated with the criminal justice system, such as prosecution, jail,
118. Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER,
AND THE EMOTIONS, NEW ESSAYS INMORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 179-82 (Ferdinand Schoeman
ed., 1987). ("Retributivism is a very straightforward theory of punishment. We are justified in
punishing because and only because offenders deserve it.").
119. Parens patriae literally means "parent of his or her country." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 511 (2d pocket ed. 2001). Under the doctrine ofparenspatriae, the state had broad
authority to act on behalf of minors, on the presumption that it acted in the best interests of those
on whose behalf it intervened.
120. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967).
121. See generally Feld, supra note 92 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000)
(discussing that in reality, juveniles receive a very different version of procedural justice than
adults).
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and indictment, was replaced by less penal vernacular such as
adjudication, detention facility, and petition. 122 Commenting on the
ethos/nature of the juvenile court, Justice Abe Fortas wrote:
The rules of criminal procedure were therefore altogether
inapplicable. The apparent rigidities, technicalities, and
harshness which they observed in both substantive and
procedural criminal law were therefore to be discarded. The
idea of crime and punishment was to be abandoned. The
child was to be "treated" and "rehabilitated" and the
procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization,
were to be "clinical" rather than punitive. 123
The "Child Savers," as the juvenile court judges came to be
known, were successful in fulfilling their mission of ideological and
physical transformation of the way the justice system treated youth.
By 1932, there were over six hundred independent juvenile courts
operating throughout the United States. 124 For close to seventy years,
the juvenile court operated as a system devoid of due process and
legal rights on behalf of children. Over time, the idealism of
benevolent judges and proper treatment fell short of being realized.
Probation and institutional treatment facilities were understaffed, and
their personnel-those responsible for clinical assessments and
delivery of services-were poorly paid and poorly trained. 125
Juvenile correctional facilities transformed themselves into more
punitive and institutional environments. 126 The informality of the
juvenile system, its lack of procedural safeguards, and the broad
scope of its authority over delinquent and pre-delinquent youth gave
way to arbitrariness and abuses of power. 127 Instances of committed
children being denied due process of law was all too common.

122. See WATKINS, JR., supra note 115, at 49.
123. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16.
124. WATKINS, JR., supra note 115, at 52.
125. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME (1967); Bishop & Farber,

supra note 96, at 132.
126. See, e.g., JEROME G. MILLER, LAST ONE OVER THE WALL: THE MASSACHUSETTS
EXPERIMENT IN CLOSING REFORM SCHOOLS 4 (1991); DAVID STREET, ROBERT D. VINTER &
CHARLES PERROW, ORGANIZATION FOR TREATMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS

FOR DELINQUENTS (1966).
127. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 26.
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In 1966, the Supreme Court decided its first case involving the
juvenile court process. 28 In Kent v. United States, the Court ruled
that a decision to transfer a boy from juvenile court to criminal court
for prosecution and punishment as an adult could not-in light of the
consequences at stake-be made without a hearing. 129 Kent signaled
the beginning of the end of an era of unbridled discretion. In 1967,
the Supreme Court decided the landmark case In re Gault. 3' In re
Gault rejected the continuation of the doctrine of parens patriae,
finding its applicability no longer appropriate in light of the
contemporary treatment of juveniles by judges and by the police. 131
Writing for the majority, Justice Abe Fortas noted that the
contemporary juvenile justice system had evolved significantly from
the early 1900s. 132 His opinion described the doctrine of parens
patriae as "murky and its historic credentials of dubious
relevance." "' The Court opined that "the appearance as well as the
actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness-in short, the
essentials of due process-may be a more impressive and more
therapeutic attitude so far as the juvenile is concerned." 134 In re
Gault is one of the most significant cases in juvenile justice
jurisprudence because it extended many of the same procedural
protections to juveniles that apply to adults in criminal
proceedings. "' The Court imported into juvenile adjudicatory
proceedings (1) the right to notice of the charges; 136 (2) the right to

128. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).

129. Id. at 554.
130. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Gerald Gault, a fifteen-year-old boy originally taken into custody for
making obscene phone calls while on probation for petty theft, had been committed to a state
institution until his twenty-first birthday. Id. at 7-8. He argued that the Arizona juvenile code was
facially invalid because it denied defendants the right to notice of charges, the right to counsel,
the right to confrontation and cross-examination, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the
right to full appellate review. As such, the Supreme Court was called upon to determine the
impact of the Due Process Clause on juvenile delinquency proceedings and it determined that due
process protection shall apply in juvenile adjudicatory proceedings. Id. at 9-10.
131. Id. at 18-19.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 16.
134. Id. at26.
135. Id. at 55.
136. Id. at 33-34.
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(3) the right to confrontation and cross-examination of

witness; 138 and (4) the privilege against self-incrimination. ' The

Court affirmed that "[d]ue process of law is the primary and
indispensable foundation of individual freedom. It is the basic and
essential term in the social compact which defines the rights of the
individual and delimits the powers which the state may exercise." 140
Three years later, the Supreme Court held that the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard of proof applicable in adult criminal
proceedings should be the standard of proof in juvenile delinquency
proceedings as well. 141 By 1971, the Court had conferred to juveniles
nearly all of the due process guarantees that apply in adult criminal
proceedings. 142 As expected, the 1970s marked a sea of change in the
way juvenile delinquency proceedings were conducted.
As juvenile justice jurisprudence evolved, courts were reminded
that although juveniles now shared many of the same due process
rights as adults, they were still minors. Minors' exercise of a legal
right is more often than not inextricably intertwined with their
parents' participation, if not consent. As judges relinquished their
surrogate parenthood and lawyers were a right rather than an
aberration, the role parents assumed in juvenile proceedings became
more significant. Formally and informally, parents were designated
roles that required their knowledge and participation in the legal
proceedings. 143 For example, the police are required in many
137. Id. at 36-37. See generally id. at 34-42 (discussing the historical development, scholarly
commentary, and reasoning behind the Supreme Court's determination that the Constitution
requires the right to counsel in juvenile proceedings).
138. Id. at57.
139. Id. at 55. In re Gault made the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
applicable to juveniles, and as a result made the Miranda protections applicable to juveniles.
Accordingly, any waiver of Miranda rights by juveniles must be made knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
140. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 20.
141. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
142. See id. at 369. A few states allow jury trials in delinquency matters, but the vast majority
of them provide for bench trials. See H. Eugene Breitenbach, Juvenile Court Proceedings, 14 AM.
JUR. TRIALS 619, 653 (1968). The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was
not squarely declared to apply to juveniles by the fact that these situations involved preadjudicatory issues, and even today the Fourth Amendment applies to various degrees to
juveniles. See WATKINS, JR., supra note 115, at 108. Questions as to the applicability of the
Exclusionary Rule to juveniles have been resolved in favor of juveniles. Id. Every court that has
specifically addressed the issue has ruled in favor of its applicability. Id.
143. A majority of jurisdictions require the presence of a parent or guardian during all stages
of juvenile proceedings. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-37-12-2 (1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-
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jurisdictions to notify parents when their child is in police custody. "
Some jurisdictions prohibit the police from interrogating children
under the age of fourteen without a parent present. 145 Some states
require children to consult with their parents prior to executing a
Miranda waiver. 146 Many jurisdictions require a parent's presence at
all delinquency proceedings. 141 Informally, judges routinely make it
their practice to ask parents for their cooperation in ensuring that
conditions imposed on their child are followed.
Not surprisingly, the juvenile justice system, with many
trappings of the adult criminal justice system, experienced an
increase in the number of children being adjudicated despite periods

B:7 (2008); TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 53.06 (Vernon 2009). When a parent cannot or will not
meet the level of engagement necessary, the court will appoint a guardian to stand in place of the
parent to assist the child in the decision making and to be present with the child throughout the
proceedings. Id.
144. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 985.101 (2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-47 (2008); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 571-31(b) (2006) ("When an officer or other person takes a child into custody the
parents, guardian, or legal custodian shall be notified immediately."); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, §3203-A(2)(A) (2003) ("When a juvenile is arrested, the law enforcement officer or the
juvenile community corrections officer shall notify the legal custodian of the juvenile without
unnecessary delay and inform the legal custodian of the juvenile's whereabouts .... ").
145. Massachusetts law requires that a juvenile under fourteen years of age must be allowed
to confer with a parent or guardian before making a Mirandawaiver. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Mass. 1983). There is a presumption that a juvenile over the
age of fourteen needs to consult with a parent or guardian unless the child is found to be highly
intelligent. See id. In Kansas, a juvenile under fourteen years of age must consult with a parent,
guardian, or counsel during custodial interrogation in order for subsequent statements made by
the juvenile to be admissible. In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d 1302, 1312-13 (Kan. 1998); see also 705
ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-405 (2009) (applying the same rule to Illinois).
146. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-511 (2008) (limiting the admissibility of statements
made by a juvenile suspect to those made in the presence of a parent or guardian after both
juvenile and adult have been apprised of the juvenile's Miranda rights); CONN. GEN. STAT. §
46b-137 (2007) (limiting the admissibility of statements or a confession by a juvenile to those
made in the presence of a parent or guardian after both juvenile and adult have been apprised of
the juvenile's Miranda rights); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-26 (2008) (requiring that a juvenile be
represented by a parent, guardian, or counsel during custodial interrogation). The Vermont
Supreme Court has indicated that a juvenile must consult with an interested adult who is not a
member of law enforcement before making a waiver, and the adult must be apprised of the
juvenile's Miranda rights. In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937, 940 (Vt. 1982). In Indiana, a juvenile's
Miranda rights may only be waived (1) by counsel if the juvenile knowingly and voluntarily joins
in the waiver; (2) by a parent or guardian if that person knowingly and voluntarily makes the
waiver, if that person has no "adverse interest" and the juvenile knowingly and voluntarily joins
the waiver; or (3) by the juvenile if the juvenile knowingly and voluntarily makes the waiver and
has been legally emancipated. IND. CODE § 31-32-5-1 (1998).
147. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-37-12-2 (1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:2-a (2008)
(stating that a parent's failure to appear may result in the appointment of a guardian ad litem to
serve the child's best interest); TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 53.06 (Vernon 2009).
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of overall decline in serious violent crime. "I The number of
delinquency cases involving pretrial detention increased 38 percent
between 1991 and 2003. "' The number of cases that were
adjudicated and resulted in out-of-home placement increased by 30
percent between 1985 and 2005. "' In the past decade, there has been
a significant increase in the number of juveniles being prosecuted in
the adult criminal justice system despite periods of decreased serious
crime among the juvenile population. 151 The increase is largely due
148. "Delinquency case rates rose from 44.2 to 63.4 per 1,000 juveniles between 1985 and
1997, declined through 2003, and then remained stable through 2005." CHARLES PUZZANCHERA
&

MELISSA

SICKMUND,

NATIONAL

CENTER

FOR

JUVENILE

JUSTICE:

JUVENILE

COURT

STATISTICS 2005 REPORT 8 (2008), available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/njcda/
pdf/jcs2005.pdf. In 2005, over 31 million youth were under juvenile court jurisdiction. Eighty
percent were between the ages of ten and fifteen, 12 percent were sixteen years old, and 8 percent
were seventeen years old. These smaller numbers of older juveniles reflect the increased number
of juveniles being transferred to adult court. Id.
149. The national detention rate for juvenile offenders in 2003 was 83 per 100,000 juveniles
in the population. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 201 (2006), available at
http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf.
The number of delinquency cases involving detention increased 48% between 1985
and 2005, from 239,900 to 354,100. The largest relative increase was for person
offense cases (144%), followed by drug offense cases (110%) and public order cases
(108%). In contrast, the number of detained property offense cases declined 22%
during this period.
PUZZANCHERA & SICKMUND, supra note 148, at 32 (noting that this Report includes only those
detention actions that resulted in juveniles being placed in a restrictive facility under court
authority while awaiting the outcome of the court process and does not include detention
decisions made by law enforcement officials prior to court intake or those occurring after the
disposition of a case).
150. PUZZANCHERA & SICKMUND, supra note 148, at 50. Between 1985 and 2005, "the
number of cases involving the use of out-of-home placement increased 139% for drug offense
cases, 94% for public order offense cases, and 89% for person offense cases but decreased 25%
for property offense cases." Id. Between 1996 and 2005, it was more likely for delinquency cases
involving juveniles ages sixteen and up to result in out-of-home placement than for juveniles ages
fifteen and below, regardless of their offense. Id. at 52.
151. The number of juvenile court cases transferred to criminal court increased 71 percent
between 1985 and 1994 and 42 percent from 1990 to 1994. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DELINQUENCY CASES WAIVED TO CRIMINAL COURT, 1988-1997,
at 2-4 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/txtfilesl/ojjdp/fs200002.txt. Between 1988 and
1997, "for every 1,000 formally handled delinquency cases, [eight] were waived to criminal
court." Id. In 1994, 11,700 delinquency cases were waived to adult court, reflecting a 73 percent
increase from 1988. Id. In 2002, 7,100 delinquency cases were waived to adult court, reflecting a
13 percent increase from 2001. ANNE L. STAHL, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DELINQUENCY CASES IN JUVENILE COURT, 2002 FACT SHEET 2
(2006), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/fs200602.pdf. In 2004, 9,400
delinquency cases were waived to adult court, reflecting a 21 percent increase from 2000 because
of changes in state laws made during the 1990s. ANNE L. STAHL, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DELINQUENCY CASES IN JUVENILE COURT, 2004 FACT SHEET
2 (2008), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/fs200801.pdf. In 1998, approximately
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to the number of states that have passed laws lowering the age at
which a minor can be charged in the adult criminal justice system
and excluding certain offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction. 152 In
response to legislation, prosecutors in a number of states can file
certain cases directly in criminal court, without receiving a judicial
determination or "waiver" from a juvenile court judge. "' The
combination of "direct file" legislation and the lowered age at which
a juvenile can be tried in adult court has effectively exposed
juveniles to harsher penalties while reducing the number of cases that
receive a judicial determination prior to being handled outside the

107,000 youth were incarcerated on any given day. Of these, approximately 14,500 were housed
in adult facilities. The largest proportion-approximately 9,100 youth-were housed in local
jails, and some 5,400 youth were housed in adult prisons. In terms of their legal status while
incarcerated, 21 percent were held as adjudicated juvenile offenders or pretrial detainees, and 75
percent were sentenced as adults. JAMES AUSTIN, KELLY DEDEL JOHNSON & MARIA
GREGORIOU, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, JUVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS: A
NATIONAL ASSESSMENT 4 (2000), availableat http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/bja/182503.pdf.
152. See PBS Frontline: Juvenile Justice Facts & Stats, available at http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/juvenile/stats/basic.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2010). In 1995,
seventeen states further expanded or amended their waiver statutes to allow juveniles to be
transferred to adult court at younger ages and for an increased number of offenses. OFFICE OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM INITIATIVES IN
THE STATES 1994-1996, http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/PUBS/reform/ch2_j.html#transfer (last visited
Nov. 8, 2009). In 2006, twenty-three states had no minimum age specified in at least one judicial
waiver, concurrent jurisdiction, or statutory exclusion provision for transferring juveniles to
criminal court. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-127 (2007) ("The court shall automatically transfer
from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court the case
of any child charged with the commission of a capital felony .... "); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 1010 (2008) ("A child shall be proceeded against as an adult where: The acts alleged to have
been committed constitute first or second degree murder .... "). In 2004, Kansas and Vermont
statutes provided conditions under which minors as young as ten years old may be transferred to
adult criminal court. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2347(a)(2)(B) (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33,
§ 5102(2)(C)(i) (2008). Since 1992, all states with the exception of Nebraska have altered their
transfer statutes to make it easier for juveniles to be waived into adult court. OFFICE OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, supra note 149, at 113-14. Between 1992 and 1995,
forty states and the District of Columbia enacted or expanded transfer provisions. Id. Between
1998 and 2002, legislatures in eighteen states enacted or expanded their transfer provisions. Id.
Between 2003 and 2004, only four states made substantive changes in transfer provisions, and
only two of those states expanded them. Id.
153. See AUSTIN, JOHNSON & GREGORIOU, supra note 151, at 2-3 ("[T]he trend across the
country is to expand the use of waivers."); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, NATIONAL SURVEY OF PROSECUTORS: PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 7
(2006), available at http://ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/psc05.pdf ("In 2005, 65% of prosecutors'
offices indicated they had proceeded against juvenile cases in criminal court. During the prior
year prosecutors' offices reported proceeding against over 23,000 juvenile cases in criminal court.
The median number of juvenile cases proceeded against in criminal court per office was four....
About 3% of the offices reported a specialized unit that prosecuted juvenile cases in criminal
court." (citation omitted)).
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jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 154 As of 2005, "there are
approximately 10,000 juveniles waived to the adult court each
year." ' To paraphrase the Supreme Court in Gault, the closer we
get to a retributive system, the greater the need for the panoply of
due process rights. 156 It follows that a parent-child testimonial
privilege is more appropriate now then ever.
A. A Juvenile's Right Against Self-Incrimination
Requires Recognition of a Parent-ChildPrivilege
Courts that have considered the admissibility of confessions by
juveniles have remarked on how police isolation and the immaturity
and vulnerability of young people create an unparalleled atmosphere
of intimidation and confusion, which can compromise the child's
decision-making capabilities. "' In the wake of Gault, courts employ
one of two tests to determine the validity of a juvenile's waiver of his
Miranda rights: the totality of the circumstances test 158 or the per se
approach. ' Both of these tests place importance on the presence of
a parent, or other interested adult, to confer with the juvenile suspect
prior to the execution of a Miranda waiver. 160 Under the per se

154. PUZZANCHERA & SICKMUND, supra note 148, at 40. As reported by national news
media, the number of juveniles who were tried as adults was on the rise during the 1990s. E.g.,
Number of Juveniles Sent to Adult Prisons Skyrocketing, Study Shows, CNN.COM, Feb. 28, 2000,
http://www.cnn.com/2000[US/02/27/juveniles.in.jail/#2 (stating more than twice the number of
youths under eighteen years of age were committed to adult prisons in 1997 than in 1985).
155. DONALD J. SHOEMAKER & TIMOTHY W. WOLFE, JUVENILE JUSTICE: A REFERENCE
HANDBOOK 50 (2005).
156. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28-31 (1967).
157. See id. at 51-52; Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S.
596, 599-600 (1948); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654, 656 (Mass. 1983); Hillary
Farber, The Role of the Parent/Guardianin a Juvenile CustodialInterrogation:Friendor Foe?,
41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1277, 1282-85 (2004).
158. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979).
159. IOWA CODE ANN § 232.11(2) (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-331(2) (2009); N.M.
STAT. § 32A-2-14 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.140(10) (2004); State v. Presha, 748 A.2d
1108, 1114 (N.J. 2000); In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d 1302, 1312-13 (Kan. 1998); A Juvenile, 449
N.E.2d at 657.
160. A small minority of states employ what has been termed a "two-tier" model. Under this
model, the age of the juvenile determines whether a court evaluates the waiver's validity
according to the totality of the circumstances test or the per se test. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 415-331 (2009) (requiring an effective waiver by a youth under sixteen years of age be made with
the agreement of the youth and youth's parent or guardian, or with advice of counsel). See
generally Kimberly Larson, Improving the "Kangaroo Courts": A Proposalfor Reform in
EvaluatingJuveniles' Waiver of Miranda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 629, 648 (2003) (explaining the twotier approach).
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approach, there are specific procedural safeguards which must be
adhered to in order for statements that are made by a juvenile during
interrogation to be admissible. 161 The safeguards range from
mandating the presence of counsel during the interrogation of a
juvenile younger than fourteen years of age, to mandating the
presence of "an interested adult," such as a parent or guardian, to
advise the juvenile on whether to waive Fifth Amendment
protection. 162 The "interested adult rule," as it is often called,
161. Seven states have created a presumption that a juvenile under a certain age cannot waive
Miranda rights or that a waiver is impermissible without an opportunity to consult with a parent.
E.g., IOWA CODE § 232.11(2) (2000) (declaring that a child under sixteen years of age cannot
waive the right to counsel without the written consent of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian
and that a waiver from a child who is at least sixteen years old is valid "only if a good faith effort
has been made to notify the child's parent"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-331(2) (2009) (stating
that a child under sixteen years of age can waive rights only with a parent's agreement; in
instances when a parent does not agree, the child can waive after consulting with counsel, and a
child who is at least sixteen years old can make an effective waiver without a parent present);
N.M. STAT. § 32A-2-14 (2006) (providing a statutory prohibition on the admission of a statement
by a child under thirteen years of age in the adjudicatory phase of a delinquency proceeding and a
presumption that a child between thirteen and fourteen is incapable of making a valid waiver of
Miranda rights; and establishing totality factors for assessing waivers of children over fourteen
years of age); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.140(10) (2004) (stating that a parent must waive rights
when a child is under twelve years of age); State v. Means, 547 N.W.2d 615, 620 (Iowa Ct. App.
1996); In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d 1302, 1312-13 (Kan. 1998) (holding that children under fourteen
years of age cannot waive the right to remain silent or the right to an attorney without first having
an opportunity to consult with a parent who is informed of the child's rights); A Juvenile, 449
N.E.2d at 657 (stating that a child under the age of fourteen cannot waive Miranda rights without
consulting with an "interested adult"; a child who is fourteen years or older should ordinarily be
given an opportunity to consult with an interested adult, and in the absence of such an
opportunity, the waiver will be upheld only if the evidence shows that the child has a "high
degree of intelligence, experience, knowledge, or sophistication"); Presha, 748 A.2d 1108, 1114
(N.J. 2000) (stating that a juvenile under the age of fourteen cannot waive Miranda rights in the
absence of a parent unless the parent is actually unavailable or unwilling to be present for
questioning); see also Kenneth J. King, Waiving Childhood Goodbye: How Juvenile Courts Fail
to ProtectChildrenfrom Unknowing, Unintelligent,and Involuntary Waivers of Miranda Rights,
2006 Wis. L. REv. 431,451 (2006).
162. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-2-511 (2008) (limiting the admissibility of statements made
by a juvenile suspect to those made in the presence of a parent or guardian after both juvenile and
adult have been apprised of the juvenile's Miranda rights); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-137 (2007)
(limiting the admissibility of statements or a confession made by a juvenile suspect to those made
in the presence of a parent or guardian after both juvenile and adult have been apprised of the
juvenile's Miranda rights); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-170 (2009) (requiring that a juvenile
under thirteen years of age suspected of murder or sexual assault be represented by counsel
during custodial interrogation); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-26 (2008) (requiring that a juvenile be
represented by a parent, guardian, or counsel during custodial interrogation). The Vermont
Supreme Court has indicated that a juvenile must consult with an interested adult who is not a
member of law enforcement before making a waiver, and the adult must be apprised of the
juvenile's Miranda rights. In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937, 940 (Vt. 1982). In Indiana, a juvenile's
Miranda rights may only be waived (1) by counsel if the juvenile knowingly and voluntarily joins
in the waiver; (2) by a parent or guardian if that person knowingly and voluntarily makes the
waiver, that person has no "adverse interest," and the juvenile knowingly and voluntarily joins the
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provides an opportunity for a private conversation between the child
and an adult with whom the child has a caring relationship prior to
making an important legal decision. 63 The interested adult is most
often the child's parent. 164
Practically, when parents arrive at the police station in response
to being informed that their child is in police custody, the police will
explain to the parents that they want to speak to the child about an
alleged crime. The police will then read the parents and the child the
Miranda rights. Before the child decides whether to waive his
Miranda rights, the police will offer the parents and child the
opportunity to confer about whether to submit to police questioning.
Some jurisdictions explicitly state that the pre-interrogation
conversation between parent and child be "meaningful." ,65 Since the
purpose of the rule is to allow parents to assist their child in deciding
waiver; or (3) by the juvenile if the juvenile knowingly and voluntarily makes the waiver and has
been legally emancipated. IND. CODE § 31-32-5-1 (1998). In Massachusetts, a juvenile under
fourteen years of age must be afforded the opportunity to confer with a parent or guardian before
making the waiver. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d at 657. A juvenile over fourteen years of age must
consult with a parent or guardian unless he is found to be highly intelligent. Id. In Kansas, a
juvenile under fourteen years of age must consult with a parent, guardian, or counsel during
custodial interrogation in order for subsequent statements made by the juvenile to be admissible.
In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1312-13.
163. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d at 657 ("We conclude that, for the Commonwealth successfully
to demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver by a juvenile, in most cases it should show that a
parent or an interested adult was present, understood the warnings, and had the opportunity to
(emphasis added)); see also Commonwealth v. Alfonso A.,
explain his rights to the juvenile ....
780 N.E.2d 1244, 1252-53 (Mass. 2003) ("The very purpose of our rules pertaining to the
opportunity for consultation with an adult is because 'most juveniles do not understand the
significance and protective function of these rights even when they are read the standard Miranda
warnings,' they 'frequently lack the capacity to appreciate the consequences of their actions,' and
the opportunity for consultation with an adult 'prevent[s] the warnings from becoming merely a
ritualistic recitation wherein the effect of actual comprehension by the juvenile is ignored."'
(quoting A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d at 656)).
164. Most often parents are deemed to be "interested adults" so long as there is no overt
antagonism between the child and the parent. See Commonwealth v. Berry, 570 N.E.2d 1004,
1007-08 (Mass. 1991). Courts have routinely upheld the Miranda waiver when a parent was
present with the minor prior to the interrogation, despite revealing a number of conflicts of
interest present before and during the interrogation. E.g., Commonwealth v. McCra, 694 N.E.2d
849, 852-53 (Mass. 1998). Whether parents can provide informed and disinterested advice to the
child in light of conflicting personal or financial interests (of which the parents and the police
may be unaware) and inadequate understanding of the Miranda rights are questions beyond the
scope of this Article. For a complete discussion of this issue, see Farber, supra note 157.
165. E.g., Alfonso A., 780 N.E.2d at 1251. However, pre-interrogation conversations between
parent and child are not meant to replicate the objective, legal-minded discussion a lawyer would
have with a child concerning the merits of waiving one's Miranda rights. Id. at 1253 n.8. Anger
and embarrassment are normal responses parents may have to their child's arrest. Farber, supra
note 157, at 1296. It is reasonable, even likely, that the parent-child conversation will be
emotionally charged and will consist of incriminating information.
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whether to speak to the police, it is difficult to imagine how a parent
could adequately provide meaningful advice without first discussing
the facts and circumstances that led to the child's arrest. If the
conversation fulfills its purpose, the child will tell the parents what
he or she knows about the alleged criminal activity, and the parents
will be able to better advise their child. 166 Courts would not require
the presence of an interested adult if the only purpose was to recite
the Miranda warnings. A police officer would surely suffice. The
"interested adult rule" exists to provide an opportunity for a full and
frank discussion between the child and an adult relative, which is
why these communications should be protected by a legal privilege.
Jurisdictions that do not adopt the per se approach use the
totality of the circumstances test to assess the validity of a juvenile
Miranda waiver. 167 Under this test, the court reviews all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the waiver. Notably, the presence of
parents or guardians is a key factor in assessing whether juveniles
gave knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waivers of their rights prior
to police questioning. 168 The consensus among judges is that the
presence of parents (or guardians) prior to and during interrogations
is an added protection for juveniles. 169

166. We do not have a lot of information about the content of these pre-interrogation
conversations but one can assume they vary in each instance. The variance depends on many
factors, such as the degree to which parents comprehend the significance of Miranda rights, the
emotional response to their child's arrest, and any conflicting interests the parents may have. See
Farber, supra note 157, at 1288-98 (discussing the many issues pertaining to the limitations of
parental advisors in the interrogation setting).
167. The federal courts and the majority of state courts employ the totality of the
circumstances test. E.g., Flowers v. State, 586 So. 2d 978 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991); Quick v. State,
599 P.2d 712, 718-20 (Alaska 1979); People v. Lara, 432 P.2d 202, 215 (Cal. 1967); State v.
Doe, 963 P.2d 392, 395 (Idaho Ct. App. 1998).
168. Significant weight is given to whether an adult was present during the interrogation and
conferred with the juvenile prior to the waiver being executed. State v. Presha, 748 A.2d 1108,
1110 (N.J. 2000) ("[C]ourts should consider the absence of a parent or legal guardian from the
interrogation area as a highly significant fact when determining whether the state has
demonstrated that a juvenile's waiver of rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary."
(emphasis added)); State v. Barnaby, 950 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) ("While parental
protection is of great importance in affecting the totality of the circumstances involved, our
courts have not held that a parent's absence makes a resulting statement illegal per se." (citations
omitted) (emphasis added)); Commonwealth v. Jones, 328 A.2d 828, 831 (Pa. 1974) ("An
importantfactor, therefore, is whether the juvenile had access to the advice of a parent, attorney,
or other adult who was primarily interested in his welfare, before making a decision to waive
constitutional rights." (emphasis added)).
169. See sources cited supra note 168.
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In light of the parents' role when their child is taken into custody
by the police, the absence of legal protection for parent-child
communications is akin to self-incrimination. Whether a jurisdiction
applies the totality of the circumstances test or the per se approach to
Miranda waivers, it is clear that both tests value (even mandate)
consultation with parents or guardians in advance of the waiver. 70 In
light of the absence of a testimonial parent-child privilege in all but
five states, the conversations between parents and children in the
police-dominated pre-interrogation atmosphere are not protected.
This means that the prosecution may subpoena parents to a grand
jury or other proceeding and require them to divulge the statements
their child made to them during the pre-interrogation conversation.
In all likelihood, since the prosecution seeks to admit statements
made by children to their parents, the parents' testimony will be used
in an attempt to convict their own children. If parentd refuse to
testify, they can be held in contempt of court. 171 The anomaly here is
blatant, as the law in several states encourages-and at times
requires-that parents and their children discuss the situation that
caused the children to be taken into custody. 72 At the same time, the
law denies any legal protection of their communications. If the
children had consulted with attorneys instead of their parents, the
attorney-client privilege would preclude the lawyers from being
compelled to reveal any communication with the children. 173 Due
process protections impose a significant conflict between the
paradigm constructed to evaluate Miranda waivers and the absence
of a testimonial privilege between parents and their children. 174
B. Parents'Rights
An equally persuasive argument in support of a parent-child
privilege is lodged in the doctrine of parental rights. Parents' rights
170. E.g., Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Mass. 1983) ("For the purpose
of obtaining [a] waiver, in the case of juveniles who are under the age of fourteen, we conclude
that no waiver can be effective without this added protection.").
171. See, e.g., Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1985). Another possibility is that a parent
will testify falsely, thereby contravening the prosecution's underlying purpose.
172. See King, supra note 161, at 451-52 (listing states that require the opportunity for
parental consultation before children can waive their Miranda rights).
173. Except in a few instances, juveniles are not mandated to consult with attorneys before
they waive their Miranda rights. See, e.g., id.
174. See, e.g., id. at 461.

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 43:551

and responsibilities are well established in American culture.
Entitlement to familial autonomy and freedom from government
interference are principles that are firmly rooted in our constitutional
jurisprudence. ' Parents enjoy substantial autonomy in deciding how
to raise their children, often making daily decisions that are left to
their unfettered discretion. 176 The Supreme Court has long resisted
encroaching on the liberty interest of fit parents to maintain the care,
custody, and control of their children. "' Two of the earliest Supreme
Court cases concerning parental rights involved the parents'
prerogative to choose the dimension of their children's education. 78
In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court invalidated a state statute
prohibiting foreign language instruction in public schools. "' The
Nebraska statute required all children be taught exclusively in
English until they reached a level of proficiency-presumably in the
eighth grade-to ensure that they were inculcated in the English
language and in American ideals. '0 The statute was challenged on
the grounds that it interfered with the liberty interest guaranteed by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 18 The
Supreme Court struck down the statute and found that it
impermissibly infringed on rights long and freely enjoyed, such as
175. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("Our jurisprudence historically has reflected
Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor
children."); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) ("We have recognized on numerous
occasions that the relationship between parent and child are constitutionally protected.").
176. It is presumed that parents act in their children's best interests. Parham,442 U.S. at 60203. Therefore, there is generally no reason for the state to question the parents' ability to make
decisions regarding their children. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000).
177. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides "heightened protection
against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests." Troxel,
530 U.S. at 65 (contemplating that the liberty interest of parents in the upbringing of their child is
the oldest fundamental liberty recognized by the Supreme Court); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citing cases that recognize that the Due Process Clause protects parents'
rights to direct the education and upbringing of their children).
178. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)
("[T]hose who nurture [a child] and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty,
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
400-03 (1923) (holding that parents had the right to direct the subjects taught to their children);
see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." (citing
Pierce,268 U.S. 510)).
179. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
180. Id. at 396, 401.
181. Id. at399.
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the right to marry, the right to establish a home, and the right to raise
children. 182
Similarly, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of
Jesus & Mary, the Court invalidated a state statute limiting parents'
right to control the type of school their children could attend. 183 The
Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, a corporation
whose mission was to care for and educate orphans according to the
tenets of the Roman Catholic Church, challenged a statute mandating
that all children between the ages of eight and sixteen attend public
school. 184 With Meyer as precedent, the Supreme Court found that
the Oregon statute unreasonably interfered "with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control." 185 The Court recognized the importance
of parental autonomy and stated that "those who nurture [a child] and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." 186 Subsequent
cases have followed the analytical framework set forth in these early
cases and have solidified a firm recognition of the fundamental right
of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of their children. 187
More recent cases have stressed the parents' presumptive right
of custody of their children and the ancillary rights derived as a result
of that custody. 188 In Troxel, the Court made paramount the
prerogative of the parent to make decisions concerning the care,

182. Id. at 403. "Evidently the Legislature has attempted materially to interfere with the
calling of modem language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and
with the power of parents to control the education of their own." Id. at 401.
183. Pierce,268 U.S. at 534-36.
184. Id. at 530-32. A violation of the statute was a misdemeanor. Id. at 530.
185. Id. at 534-35.
186. Id. at 535.
187. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (discussing the fundamental
liberty interest of parents in the "care, custody, and management" of their child's life); Parham v.
J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) ("The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong
tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of
the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring

American tradition.").
188. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-67 (2000); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 657-58 (1972) (nullifying a state statute that presumes a biological father is unfit to care for
and maintain custody of his children).
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custody, and control of one's child. '9 The Court struck down a
Washington statute that permitted courts to grant visitation rights to
anyone seeking them, if so doing would serve the best interests of the
child, even when the natural or adoptive parent objected. "' The
Court found that the statute, which placed the best interests of the
child before the preference of the parent, impermissibly infringed on
parents' fundamental liberty interest in making decisions concerning
the care, custody and control of their children. 191 More broadly, the
Court noted that, according to this statute, a court could overturn any
decision by a fit parent based solely on the judge's determination of
what is in the child's best interests. 192
The parental rights doctrine emerged out of these cases with
strength and vigor and is now part of the fabric of our American
culture. The due process protections that exist to protect the
intimacies of familial relationships should extend to parents who
refuse to testify against their minor children. Government
compulsion of parental testimony against minor children
unconstitutionally interferes with parents' right of care, custody, and
control of their own children. As Justice David Souter stated in
Troxel, "[P]arental choice.., is not merely a default rule in the
absence of either governmental choice or the government's
designation of an official with the power to choose for whatever
reason and in whatever circumstances." ' 93 It follows that the
government should be precluded from forcing unwilling parents to
testify on the grounds that such testimony violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

189. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75.
190. The Revised Code of Washington permits "[a]ny person" to petition a superior court for
visitation rights "at any time," and authorizes the court to grant such visitation rights whenever
"visitation may serve the best interest of the child." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.10.160(3)
(West 2009). Petitioners Jenifer and Gary Troxel asked a Washington superior court for the right
to visit their grandchildren. Respondent, who was the children's mother, opposed the petition.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60.
191. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72. "The liberty interest at issue in this case-the interest of parents
in the care, custody, and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests recognized by this Court." Id. at 65.
192. Id. at67.
193. Id. at79.
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III. ADOLESCENT DECISION MAKING CAN BE
ENHANCED BY PARENTAL ASSISTANCE: EVIDENCE
FROM PSYCHOLOGY AND NEUROSCIENCE

Neuroscience and behavioral science suggest that children are
not capable of meaningfully assessing and appreciating the
consequences of their decisions. An adolescent's ability to process
and comprehend information is not solely attributable to intellectual
capacity; the physical growth of the brain is also a highly important
factor. 194 There is important legal precedent for the proposition that
children's cognitive and psychosocial maturity mitigate their
criminal culpability. 195 The confluence of neuroscience, social
science, and law supports the popular belief that adult supervision
and guidance enhance the quality of children's decisions. This
research is valuable in supporting the argument for a parent-child
evidentiary privilege.
In the past twenty years, adolescent development, decision
making, and judgment have been studied extensively. 96 Much of this
research focuses on the cognitive differences between adults and
adolescents. Research shows a strong correlation between the
psychosocial characteristics of adolescence and its effect on the
process of making judgments. 197 Social scientists explain that the
rapid and pervasive changes in cognitive, emotional, and social
capacities that characterize adolescence correlate with certain
characteristics of adolescent decisions. For example, mid-to-late
teens have a relative lack of life experience and sophistication. As a
result, they are less likely to be cognizant of the range of their
options, less able to identify and weigh alternatives, and less able to
appreciate the long-term consequences of their decisions. 9'
194. See Abigail A. Baird & Jonathan A. Fugelsang, The Emergence of Consequential
Thought: Evidence from Neuroscience, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y B: BIOLOGICAL
ScI. 1797, 1800 (2004).
195. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561-88 (2005).
196. Psychosocial factors are often referred to as "judgment" factors, because they refer to
things like risk perception, self-perception, emotions, motivations, time perspective, and
responsiveness to others that influence our preferences and ultimately, the judgments that we
make. See Elizabeth S. Scott, N. Dickon Reppucci & Jennifer L. Woolard, EvaluatingAdolescent
Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 221,222-23 (1995).
197. See Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, Researching Adolescents'Judgment and
Culpability,in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra
note 92, at 325, 326-27.
198. See, e.g., Baird & Fugelsand, supra note 194, at 1801-02.
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Although there are wide variations among individuals, adolescents as
a group tend to process information differently than do adults, and
their judgments reflect preferences and orientations that tend to be
characteristic of this unique developmental period. i' Overall, social
science researchers agree that adolescents are less capable than
adults of making positive decisions autonomously.
Some of the characteristics of adolescent psychosocial
development that are most relevant to the discussion of why adult
assistance can assist a child in making well-reasoned decisions are as
follows:
* Adolescents have a different sense of time-they tend to
pay more attention to short-term consequences and
discount whatever long-term consequences they do
see. 200
"
Compared to adults, adolescents are more impetuous;
when emotions are running high, adolescent judgment is
impaired. 201
* Adolescent emotions are subject to rapid and dramatic
change. 202
• Adolescents are more likely to engage in risky behavior
than are adults. 203
" Adolescents are more susceptible to peer pressure than
are adults. 204

199. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A
Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137,
160-64 (1997).
200. See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1012 (2003). Age plays an important role in the gaining of life experience.
Since adolescents have not lived as long as their adult counterparts, they are less aware of their
options, less able to identify and weigh alternatives, and less able to appreciate the long-term
consequences of decision. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence,
29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 552-54 (2000). Poor urban youth tend to be more "present focused"
than their middle-class counterparts; see Carolyn M. Brown & Richard Segal, Ethnic Differences
in Temporal Orientation and Its Implicationsfor Hypertension Management, 37 J. HEALTH SOC.
BEHAV. 350 (1996); see also Bishop & Farber, supra note 96; King, supra note 161.
201. See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 211 (1999); Bishop
& Farber, supra note 96, at 159 (citing Laurence Steinberg, Risk Taking in Adolescence: New
Perspectives From Brain and Behavioral Science, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 56
(2007)).
202. See Steinberg & Scott, supra note 200, at 1012-13.
203. See id.
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Even adolescents with an adult-like capacity to make decisions,
will not make the same decisions as their adult counterpart because
of the biological and psychosocial differences between the two. 205
Add to the existing divide the fact that children involved in the
juvenile justice system have less capacity to reason than many of
their non-delinquent counterparts. Statistics reveal that an
extraordinarily high percentage of children in the juvenile justice
system have mental disorders compared to children outside the
juvenile justice system. 206 A 2002 study by the MacArthur Research
Network on adolescent development and juvenile justice reported
that the mean intelligence quotient (IQ) of detained youth was
approximately 11.88 points lower than children in the community at
large. 207
Biological science research asserts that children are incapable of
assessing and appreciating the consequences of their decisions
because of the physiology of the adolescent brain. 208 This is because
the executive center of the brain-the part responsible for foresight,
planning, self-regulation, and strategic thinking-develops gradually
over time. 209 Its development is generally not complete until the early

204. See id. at 1012; see also DEVIANT PEER INFLUENCES IN PROGRAMS FOR YOUTH:
PROBLEMS & SOLUTIONS 118-19 (Kenneth A. Dodge, Thomas J. Dishion & Jennifer E.
Lansford, eds., 2006).
205. See King, supra note 161, at 436 (citing Steinberg & Scott, supra note 200, at 1012).
206. See King, supra note 161, at 443. For example, "[a] 1994 study based on site visits to
ninety-five public and private juvenile facilities found that 73 percent of the children reported
mental health problems." Mental Health America, Fact Sheet: Children's Mental Health
Statistics, Juvenile Justice, http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/go/information/get-info/childrens-mental-health/children-s-mental-health-statistics (last visited Feb. 27, 2010). A study of
Maryland juvenile facilities revealed that 57 percent of the children had a history of mental illness
and 53 percent had at least one diagnosed mental disorder. Henry R. Cellini, Mental Health
Concerns ofAdjudicated Adolescents, 4 OFFENDER PROGRAMS REP. 17, 16-26 (2000), available
at http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=184634. Approximately 77 percent
of the children in Virginia's secure detention facilities met diagnostic criteria for at least one
mental health disorder, while research on children in Georgia's juvenile detention facilities
indicates that 61 percent of the youth had a mental disorder, including substance-abuse disorders.
Id. In South Carolina, a random sample of youth in state-run juvenile justice facilities found that
72 percent met all criteria for at least one mental health disorder. Id.; see also Thomas Grisso,
Adolescent Offenders with Mental Disorders, 18 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: JUVENILE JUSTICE
143,
148 (2008), available at http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/
docs/18_02_07.pdf.
207. Janet I. Warren et al., Correlates of Adjudicative Competence Among Psychiatrically
ImpairedJuveniles, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 299, 302-05 (1999).
208. Baird & Fugelsang, supra note 194, at 1801-02.
209. Bishop & Farber, supra note 96, at 153.
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twenties. 210 Thus, adolescents' capacity to make decisions based on
logical reasoning, such as envisioning alternative choices, identifying
likely consequences of particular choices, and weighing alternatives
according to societal norms and expectations, is compromised until
adulthood.
In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court abolished the death
penalty for crimes committed by juveniles. 2 ' Justice Anthony
Kennedy, writing for the majority, underscored three characteristics
about juveniles that supported the Court's decision. First, "[a] lack of
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in
youth more often than in adults and are more understandable among
the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill'
Second, "juveniles are more
considered actions and decisions."212
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside
pressures, including peer pressure ....This is explained in part by
the prevailing circumstance that juveniles have less control, or less
experience with control, over their own environment." 2 3' Third, "the
character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The
personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed."214 The
Court reasoned that because of these characteristics, juvenile
offenders-even those who commit heinous acts-are significantly

210. Longitudinal research using magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)and other sophisticated
scanning techniques, such as magnetic resonance spectroscopy (MRS) or positron emission
tomography (PET) scans, have provided images of brain function at rest and during various tasks
through adolescence and into adulthood. These technologies illustrate that the prefrontal cortex
undergoes dramatic changes during adolescence, and is one of the last areas of the brain to reach
maturity. Id. at 153 n. 164 (citing Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain Growth
and Gray Matter Density Reduction in Dorsal Frontal Cortex: Inverse Relationships During
Post-Adolescent Brain Maturation, 21 J. NEUROSCIENCE 8819, 8826-29 (2001)); Jay N. Giedd et
al., Brain Development During Childhood and Adolescence: A Longitudinal MRI Study, 2
NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861 (1999)). See generally King, supra note 161, at 434-44.
211. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that imposing the death penalty
for crimes committed by a minor under the age of eighteen violates the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment). Christopher Simmons was seventeen years old
when he and his two friends, ages fifteen and sixteen, respectively, broke into the home of an
elderly woman to commit burglary and murder. Id. at 556-57. They tied her up with duct tape and
electrical wire, and drove her to a state park, where they threw her from a bridge into a river
below. Id.
212. Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
213. Id. (citation omitted); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)
("[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may
").
be most susceptible to influence ....
214. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (citation omitted).
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less culpable than adults. 215 The Court concurred with the biological
and social science research which supports that, cognitively and
developmentally speaking, most juveniles are incapable of thoughtful
and well-reasoned decisions, specifically, decisions unlikely to
produce injurious outcomes.
Until Roper, the Court did not explicitly rely on social science
and neuroscience to support the significant cognitive differences
between children and adults. However, earlier cases recognized the
vulnerability and immaturity of juveniles as well as the need for
parental assistance to help relieve the pressures associated with
police interrogations. 216
The court's ruling logically extends the idea that children will
typically benefit from adult knowledge and advice when making
important decisions. 27 This is evidenced by the numerous state and
federal laws that require parental consent prior to allowing early
adolescents to engage in particular acts. These laws are premised on
the understanding that young teens are not mature enough to engage
in a range of activities and therefore must be afforded certain
privileges. 28 For example, most states do not allow persons under
eighteen to marry without parental consent. 29 However, most states
do allow sixteen- and seventeen-year-old individuals (but not
215. Id. at 571-73.
216. See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962) (reaffirming that without adult
protection, a juvenile may be unable to "protect his own interests or ... get the benefits of his
constitutional rights"); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600-01 (1948) (stopping short of
announcing guidelines for police questioning of juveniles, but suggesting that without "someone
on whom to lean," a juvenile will be "crush[ed]" by "the overpowering presence of the law," and
our established understandings of fairness and due process will be violated). In Gallegos,
following an arrest for robbery, the juvenile was held in police custody for five days without any
contact with either a relative or a lawyer. 370 U.S. at 54. When invalidating the admissibility of
the confession, the Court noted the petitioner's youth and immaturity: "[W]e deal with a person
who is not equal to the police in knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the
Id. In order to reduce the "unequal footing" between
questions and answers being recorded ....
the juvenile and police, a lawyer, relative, or adult friend should have been made available to the
juvenile, because these individuals "could have given the petitioner the protection which his own
immaturity could not." Id.
217. Researchers have identified a number of psychosocial factors that are especially salient
during the teen years, and which contribute to the adolescent characteristics of immaturity,
impetuosity, and vulnerability noted by the Court in Roper. See Scott et al., supra note 196, at
229-32.
218. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982) ("Our history is replete with
laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less
mature and responsible than adults.").
219. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
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younger teens) to marry with parental consent. 220 Most states also
require parental consent for medical procedures for minor children
prior to more critical procedures such as organ donations, 22 ' blood
donation,222 body piercing, and tattooing. 223 In addition, most state
insurance laws prohibit minor children from contracting for
insurance without parental consent. 224
Logic suggests that requiring parental oversight and approval
adds an important level of assurance that the decision to engage in
the activity is well considered and a product of mature judgment.
Legal schemes universally require parental approval before minors of
a certain age can engage in certain activities. It follows that the law
should incentivize children to communicate as openly and honestly
as possible with their parents in an effort to maximize the assistance
parents can render. As the law is currently written, in all but five
states parents could be compelled to reveal the content of their
communication against their child's interest.

220. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-2-106, -108 (2009), amended by Act of May 15,
2009, ch. 264, § 5, 2009 Colo. Sess. Laws 264 (allowing a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old child to
marry with parental or judicial consent, but both parental and judicial consent for a child under
the age of sixteen); D.C. CODE §§ 46-403, -411 (2005) (requiring both parties to be at least
sixteen years old and requiring parental consent for any party under eighteen years old); HAW.
REv. STAT. §§ 572-1, -2 (2006) (allowing fifteen-year-old children to marry with parental and
judicial consent and requiring parental consent for children under the age of eighteen); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 207, §§ 7, 24, 25 (2007) (allowing a court to issue an order allowing the marriage
of a minor under the age of eighteen only if there is parental consent).
221. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7150.15 (West 2009) (prohibiting anatomical
gifts from children under the age of fifteen, unless emancipated, and requiring parental consent
for minors between the ages of fifteen and eighteen).
222. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §1607.5 (West 2009) (requiring parental consent and
authorization from a physician before a child between the ages of fifteen and seventeen may give
blood); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-22-104(4) (2009), amended by Act of Mar. 19, 2009, ch. 27, § 1,
2009 Colo. Sess. Laws 27 (allowing a minor between sixteen and eighteen years of age to consent
to donating blood as long as parent also consents).
223. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 381.0075 (2009) (prohibiting a child under the age of sixteen
from undergoing body piercing unless accompanied by parent or guardian and requiring written
notarized parental consent for children under the age of eighteen); FLA. STAT. § 877.04 (2009)
(prohibiting a child under the age of eighteen from being tattooed without written notarized
consent by a parent or legal guardian); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1523 (2004) (prohibiting
tattooing of a minor under the age of fourteen and requiring parental consent to tattoo a child
between fourteen and eighteen years of age).
224. CAL. INS. CODE § 10112 (West 2009) (requiring a minor under the age of sixteen to have
written parental consent before entering into a contract for insurance).
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IV. FEDERAL EFFORTS TO CODIFY
A PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE

Since 1996, Congress has considered a parent-child privilege in
four separate legislative sessions, all of which were unsuccessful. 225
The common law has not been much kinder. No federal circuit has
recognized a parent-child privilege, though four circuits have said, in
dicta, that if unemancipated minors confided in their parents, the
court would be more receptive to finding a parent-child privilege. 226
Only one federal district court has recognized a parent-child
privilege where the communication was between minors and their
parent. 227
On February 23, 1998, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont
introduced legislation (Senate Bill 1721) instructing the Attorney
General and the Judicial Conference of the United States to study
important questions concerning the establishment of a privilege to8
22
protect parent-child communications in civil and criminal cases.
Leahy's legislation was prompted by the treatment of Monica
Lewinsky's mother, Marcia Lewis, by Independent Counsel Kenneth
Starr.22 9 Starr subpoenaed Marcia Lewis to testify before the grand
jury investigating President Bill Clinton as to statements Monica
Lewinsky was believed to have made to her mother concerning her
relationship with Clinton. 230 Despite her lawyers' best efforts, and
public sentiment opposed to intruding into the private conversations
between mother and daughter, no privilege barred Starr from
compelling the disclosure of this information. 231 Leahy explained:
This is the United States of America. This is not the Star
Chamber of hundreds of years ago. This is not the Spanish
Inquisition. No child, no matter what their age, expects his
or her conversations with a parent to be disclosed to
prosecuting attorneys, [sic] compelling a parent to betray
his or her child's confidence is repugnant to fundamental
225. The unsuccessful legislative sessions were held in 1998, 1999, 2001, and 2003. See
supra note 11.
226. See Note, Parent-ChildLoyalty and Testimonial Privilege,supra note 9, at 910.
227. In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1302-07 (D. Nev. 1983).
228. 144 CONG. REc. S803-01, at S803-S804 (1998).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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notions of family, fidelity, and privacy. Indeed, I can think
of nothing more destructive of the family and family values,
nor more undermining of frank communications between
parent and child, than the example of a zealous prosecutor
who decides to take advantage of close-knit ties between
mother and daughter, of a prosecutor who said, if a mother
loves a daughter and a daughter will go to a mother to talk
to that mother, then we are going to grab the mother. Great
family values, Mr. President. Great family values, Mr.
Starr. 232

Simultaneously in the House of Representatives, U.S.
Representative Zoe Lofgren introduced House of Representatives
Bill (H.R.) 3577, known as "The Confidence in Family Act."2 33 This
bill proposed to create a parent-child privilege in federal criminal and
civil proceedings, and to amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to
codify this privilege. One of Representative Lofgren's principal
justifications for the proposed legislation was her belief that the
parent-child relationship merits the protection of a testimonial
privilege for the same reasons that the spousal relationship does. 234
According to Lofgren, "the relationship between mother and
daughter, between father and daughter, between father and son is as35
2
valuable, as precious as that between husband and wife."
Representative Lofgren called the absence of such a privilege a
"trilemma" of cruel choices for parents compelled to testify against
their children: perjury, betrayal of the child's confidence, or potential
jail time for contempt of court. 236

232. Id. at S804. Although the bill was read twice and referred to the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, it never made it out of the committee's hands. See Jefferson, infra note 237, at 458.
233. H.R. 3577, 105th Cong. (1998).
234. This amendment would ensure that parents and children could not be compelled to
testify against one another, and that confidential communications between parents and children
would be protected. Id. These privileges would be similar to the privileges currently provided
under federal law to spouses and would be developed by the courts in light of the common law,
reason, and experience. Modeled after the marital privilege announced in Trammel v. United
States, the legislation contained both an adverse testimonial privilege and a confidential
communication privilege. 144 CONG. REC. H2269 (1998).
235. See 144 CONG. REC. H2269 (1998) (statement of Rep. Lofgren, April 23, 1998).
236. See 144 CONG. REC. H2272 (1998).
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The House bill failed largely because it was too broad. 237 The
proposed privilege made no distinction between adult children and
minor children. 238 The privilege was designed to pertain to any
relationship where an individual had a legal right to act as a parent. 239
This definition included foster children and long-term custody
relationships. 240 Some lawmakers suggested that they would support
a parent-child privilege limited to minor children in civil cases only.
The implication was that shielding inculpatory communications
between children and parents from a criminal investigative arm of
the government was contrary to public policy. 24 The legislation was
fashioned in accordance with the spousal privilege, but left to the
courts to determine its applicability to specific situations. 242 "The
Confidence in Family Act" was rejected by a vote of 162 to 256 on
April 23, 1998.243
A separate bill, H.R. 4286, known as "The Parent-Child
Privilege Act," was introduced by Representative Robert Andrews of
New Jersey. 2" This bill also sought to amend the Federal Rules of
Evidence to establish a parent-child privilege. 245 The proposed
legislation would create an adverse testimonial privilege and a
confidential communications privilege similar to the spousal
privileges. 246 Under the proposed bill, the privilege would survive
the death of parents or their children and would apply even if the
parent-child relationship has been terminated. 247 Andrews first
237. See generally Shonah P. Jefferson, The Statutory Development of the Parent-Child
Privilege: Congress Responds to Kenneth Starr's Tactics, 16 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 429, 457 (1999)

(discussing the failure of legislation via House Judiciary deliberations on H.R. 3577).
238. See id.
239. 144 CONG. REC. H2268 (1998).

240. Id.
241. Id. at H2270.
242. See H.R. 3577, 105th Cong. (1998).
243. Jefferson, supra note 237, at 456.
244. H.R. 4286, 105th Cong. (1998).
245. Id.
246. See Jefferson, supra note 237, at 456.
247. The bill included the standard exceptions for testimonial privileges: (1) in any civil
action or proceeding by the parent against the child or the child against the parent; (2) in any civil
action in which the child's parents are opposing parties; (3) in any civil action contesting the
estate of the child or child's parent; (4) any proceeding concerning custody, dependency,
deprivation, abandonment, support, abuse or neglect of child, termination of parental rights; (5) in
any criminal or juvenile proceeding in which the parent or child is charged with an offense
against the person or property of the child, parent, or any member of the household or family.
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introduced this bill in 1998, then again in 1999, 2001, 2003, and
2005. 24' The legislation failed to clear the House Judiciary
Committee each time.
State Level Efforts to Create a Statutory
or Common Law Parent-ChildPrivilege
State legislatures have been debating recognition of a parentchild privilege and most have rejected even a limited privilege. 249
Only five states currently provide any type of protection for parentchild communications. 25 New York has the only judicially
recognized privilege, applying to confidential communications
between minors and their guardians. 251 New York expressed its
commitment to protecting the integrity of the family unit by
recognizing that "communications . . . within the context of the
family relationship" may be protected according to the constitutional
right of privacy. 252
In In re A&M, a sixteen-year-old boy became the target of an
arson investigation after witnesses claimed he was near the scene of
the fire. 253 Prosecutors subpoenaed the boy's parents to testify before
the grand jury about what their son had told them in relation to the
suspicious fire. 254 The parents moved to quash the subpoena on the
grounds that in the privacy of their home, their son had confided in
them with the expectation that such information would be kept
confidential. 255 Relying upon a wealth of precedents establishing that
the integrity of family interests is entitled to constitutional protection,
the New York court found that the conversation between the child
and his parents in this situation was the embodiment of the intimate
and confidential relationship among family members. 256
CONG. REC.H. R. 3433 (July 26, 2005). The bill also assigns a guardian ad litem or attorney for a
minor child to represent the child's interests with respect to the privilege. Id.
248. See supra note 11.
249. See infra Part V.
250. See supra note 8.
251. See In re A&M, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (App. Div. 1978).
252. Id. at 381.

253. See id. at 377.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. Id. at 378 ("It would be difficult to think of a situation which more strikingly embodies
the intimate and confidential relationship which exists among family members than that in which
a troubled young person, perhaps beset with remorse and guilt, turns for counsel and guidance to

Winter 2010]

TESTIFYAGAINST YOUR CHILD?

In re A&M is particularly informative because it implicates the
"essential parent-child privilege." One year later, a New York trial
court expanded the parameters of the newly recognized parent-child
privilege. 25 7 The court in People v. Fitzgeraldheld that the privilege
applied despite the age of the child because the communication
between father and son in this case was confidential and for the
purpose of obtaining support, guidance, or advice. 258 In In re Ryan,
the trial court extended the privilege to communications between the
minor and his grandmother, who had raised him for most of his life
as his parent. 259
Connecticut, Idaho, Massachusetts, and Minnesota have
statutory parent-child privileges that apply to children under eighteen
years old, although these privileges are not equal in scope. 260 The
Massachusetts law prevents minor children from being compelled to
testify against their natural or adoptive parents in an adult
prosecution, unless the inquiry involves domestic violence or child
abuse.2 6 1 Conversely, Massachusetts has deferred to the legislature
for consideration of a privilege protecting parents from testifying
against their children.262 Connecticut and Idaho have the most
his mother and father. There is nothing more natural, more consistent with our concept of the
parental role, than that a child may rely on his parents for help and advice. Shall it be said to those
parents, 'Listen to your son at the risk of being compelled to testify about his confidences?').
257. See People v. Fitzgerald, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Westchester County Ct. 1979).
258. Id. at 314,317.
259. In re Ryan, 474 N.Y.S.2d 931, 932 (Fam. Ct. 1984).
260. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-138a (2008) (allowing the parent of a minor accused in a
juvenile proceeding to "elect or refuse to testify for or against the accused child," with the
exception that the parent may be compelled to testify if he or she is the victim of violence
allegedly inflicted by the child); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-203(7) (2009) (ensuring a parent or
guardian "shall not be forced to disclose any communication made by their minor child or ward to
them concerning matters in any civil or criminal action to which such child or ward is a party,"
unless the case is a civil action by one against the other, a criminal action for violence of one
against the other, or in any case of physical injury to the minor caused by physical abuse or
neglect by the parent or guardian); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (West 2004)
(preventing a minor child from testifying against his or her parent); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(j)
(2008) (disallowing a parent's examination "as to any communication made in confidence by the
minor to the minor's parent," except in certain enumerated situations).
261. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (West 2004). The law operates as a
disqualification. See id.
262. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 722 N.E.2d 450, 451-52 (Mass. 2000). In 2000, two
Massachusetts teenagers were arrested for rape and their parents were subpoenaed to testify
before the grand jury regarding communications they had with their sons pertaining to the rape
accusation. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court stayed the enforcement of the subpoenas in order to
allow the legislature the opportunity to consider the important social policy issue inherent in the
establishment of a parent-child privilege and its effect on children and families. Id. at 456. In

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW

[Vol.43:551

protective legislation among the states that have a parent-child
privilege. Under Connecticut law, parents can refuse to testify in
delinquency proceedings against their minor children; but parents
who are victims of a violent act by the child may testify. 263 The
privilege extends to communications and observations made by the
parent.264 In Idaho, parents are not forced to disclose any
communications made by their minor children in any civil or
criminal action to which the child is a party, unless the case is a civil
action by one against the other or involves violence by one against
the other. 265
In other states that have contemplated a parent-child privilege,
advocates have been unsuccessful in garnering support for similar
legislation, either because the legislation was not limited to minor
children or because it applied equally to civil and criminal cases. 266
1. Oregon
One such example is Senate Bill 313, which was introduced in
the Oregon legislature in early 2009. 267 The bill proposed creating an
evidentiary privilege for confidential communications made between
parents and their children under the age of eighteen. 268 Either the
child or the parent/guardian to whom the communication was made
could claim the privilege. The proposed bill contained specific
exemptions, such as when a child is charged with committing a
delinquent criminal act against the parent to whom the

1983, the court had declined to create a disqualification for minor children subpoenaed to testify
against their parents. See Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203, 1208 (Mass.
1983). Subsequent to this ruling, the legislature enacted a testimonial privilege for minor children.
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (West 2004). Consequently, Massachusetts State
Senator Cynthia Creem introduced legislation in support of a parent-child privilege that would
protect parents from being forced to reveal communications between themselves and their minor
children. See supra Axtman, note 111, at 1. The 2000 legislation was stalled in a committee and
was never voted on by the state legislature. Senator Creem reintroduced the bill several times
subsequent to 2000. A current version of Senator's Creem's legislation, Senate Bill 1670, "An
Act relative to testimony in criminal proceedings," is presently before the Massachusetts Joint
Committee on the Judiciary. See S.B. 1670, 186th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2009).
263. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-138a (2008).
264. Id.
265. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-203(7) (2009).
266. See, e.g., S.B. 313, 75th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); S.B. 90, 35th Sess., 2003
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2003).
267. See S.B. 313, 75th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009).
268. Id.
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communication was made, the parent's property, or against another
child of the parent. 269 The bill passed the Oregon Senate in March
2009 and was referred to the Oregon House of Representatives for
consideration. 270 In June 2009, however, the proposed legislation
was defeated in a House vote.
2. Illinois
In 1998, Illinois State Representative Daniel J. Burke introduced
House Bill 2167, which would have amended the Illinois Code to
create a parent-child privilege. 271 The bill covered written and oral
communications between adult or minor children and their parents, 272
and it allowed both parents and children to assert the privilege. 273
The Illinois State Bar Association supported the proposed
privilege. 274 The majority of the opposition to the legislation focused
on the breadth of the bill. 275 State representative Rosemary Mulligan
voiced concern that the bill would have a "chilling affect [sic] on any
child abuse cases," presumably because it might prevent courts from
forcing children to testify regarding abuse. 276 Representative Cross
voiced concern that the privilege would impede proper
determinations in custody disputes. 277 Other legislators objected to

269. Id.
270. See Salem-News.com, Two Bills Supporting Oregon Parents Pass the Senate, SALEMNEWS, Mar. 20, 2009, http://www.salem-news.com/articles/march202009/senate bills 3-2009.php.
271. TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE, H.R. 90, 90th Gen. Ass., 108th Legis. Day, at 11-12 (Ill.
1998), available at http://www.ilga.gov/house/transcripts/htrans90/tO40298.pdf ("Many of you
here are quite familiar with the attorney client privilege. There exists in law, the untouchable
secrecy of the confessional and the privileged communication between a doctor and patient. In
some cases even the media has attempted to claim this exemption. Are these relationships any
more important than that of a parent to child? And what might the affect [sic] be if these secret
entitled communications were corrupted and society would lose confidence in the confidentially
of communication with these parties? I submit to this Body, that certain relationships must remain
sacred, incorruptible, inviolate and secure.").
272. See id. at 20.
273. See id. at 19.
274. See id.
275. The legislation proposed in the House was devoid of certain exceptions that are
commonly included with such privileges, such as in cases alleging physical abuse. See id. at 3031.
276. Id. at 26.
277. Id. at 14.
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the privilege applying equally for both adult and minor children. 278
Ultimately, a vote on the bill was postponed indefinitely.
3. Florida
In 2003, the Florida legislature proposed a bill that would have
allowed "a parent and a child to refuse to disclose certain
communications between them that were intended to be
confidential." 279 Governor Jeb Bush vetoed this legislation on the
ground that it was overly broad. 280 The governor wrote:
I understand that the relationship between a parent and a
child is unique and that free and open communication
between a parent and child should be encouraged. However,
I have concerns that the privilege created by this bill is
overly broad. While a privilege limited to communications
between a parent and a minor child may be entirely
appropriate, this legislation does not limit the privilege to
communications between parents and minor children.
Instead, the privilege would apply to communications
between a parent and a child of any age, including an adult
child. I agree with the view of the state prosecutors that this
broad language would adversely affect criminal
investigations and would ultimately result in the delay of
prosecutions in legal proceedings. 281
4. New Jersey
The New Jersey legislature also considered a parent-child
privilege in the wake of the Monica Lewinsky-President Clinton
scandal. In 2000, the General Assembly and the Senate proposed a
joint resolution in support of the creation of a new rule of evidence
that prohibited disclosure of confidential communications between
parents and their children. 282 The proposed rule was intended to

278. See, e.g., id. at 20-21.
279. Florida Governor's Message, S.B. 90, 35th Sess., 2003 Reg. Sess. (June 26, 2003).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Assem. J. Res. 31, 209th Leg., 2000-01 Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2000), available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2000/Bills/ajr/3 1_il .htm.
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apply to both criminal and civil proceedings and contained the
standard exceptions that exist with most privileges. 283
V. FEDERAL COMMON LAW AND THE RESPONSE
TO THE PROPOSAL FOR A PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE
One might think that the longevity and intimacy of the parentchild relationship would be a persuasive rationale for judges to
protect parent-child communications, but that has not been the case.
Only one federal court has recognized an evidentiary privilege for

283. Id. A new rule designated as Rule 518 is adopted to read as follows:
Rule 518. Parent-child privilege, a. A child and his or her parent, guardian or legal
custodian shall not be required to disclose a confidential communication made by one
to the other unless either the parent or the child consent.
b. A communication between a child and his or her parent, guardian or legal
custodian shall be deemed confidential despite being made before the child's sibling or
other parent.
c. This privilege shall not apply to:
(1) a civil action or proceeding commenced by the child's parent, guardian or
legal custodian against the child or by the child against the child's parent, guardian or
legal custodian; or commenced by the child's parent, guardian or legal custodian
against the child's other parent, guardian or legal custodian; or
(2) a civil action or proceeding contesting the estate of the child or the child's
parent, guardian, legal custodian; or
(3) a criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed against the person or
property of the child, the child's parent, guardian or legal custodian; or
(4) a matrimonial action; or
(5) a civil commitment proceeding against the child or the child's parent,
guardian or legal custodian; or
(6) any action or proceeding concerning child abuse, parental abuse, child
neglect, abandonment, nonsupport, child custody or parenting time; or
(7) any action or proceeding where the communication is relevant to an issue
between the parent and the child; or
(8) any action alleging domestic violence in violation of the "Prevention of
Domestic Violence Act of 1991," P.L. 1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-17 et.seq.).
d. When the child is a minor, under the age of 18, the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem or an attorney or both to represent the minor's interest. When the
parent or child is incompetent or deceased, consent to the disclosure may be given for
such parent or child by the guardian, executor or administrator.
e. The requirement for consent shall not terminate with the emancipation of the
child.
2. The rule set forth in section 1 of this Joint Resolution, if ordered adopted by
the Supreme Court, shall take effect on the date set forth in the court order of adoption.
3. This joint resolution shall take effect immediately upon signature thereof by
the Governor; and the Secretary of State is directed to transmit an authenticated copy
forthwith to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
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parent-child communications. 284 Most courts that have refused to
recognize a parent-child privilege have done so in cases involving
adult children compelled to testify against their parents or vice
versa. 285 Despite the outcomes in these cases, many courts have
expressed a willingness to find a privilege either for an
unemancipated minor or when an "essential parent-child privilege"
existed. 286 Catherine Ross calls the "essential parent-child privilege"
a narrower version of the parent-child privilege. The "essential
parent-child privilege" prevents the "disclosure of confidential
communications from children to their parents in order to foster
meaningful communications in a relationship that is seen as essential
to numerous public policy goals." 287 The paucity of reported cases
implicating the "essential parent-child privilege" may create the
illusion that compelling parental testimony is an extraordinary
occurrence. 288 However, we know from media accounts and the few
reported cases, that prosecutors can and do compel parents to testify
against their minor children. 289
As important, and perhaps more common, are explicit or
implicit threats of compulsion that may influence parents' and
children's decisions on how to proceed with a case. Tactically,
prosecutors benefit from the option of compelling parents to testify.
For example, in a juvenile prosecution in which the government
subpoenas an unwilling parent, the juvenile may choose to resolve
the case on terms favorable to the prosecution in lieu of forcing the
parent to choose to testify or to be found in contempt of court.
284. Note, Parent-ChildLoyalty and Testimonial Privilege,supra note 9, at 915.
285. Id.
286. See, e.g., In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11, 16 (2d Cir. 1993) (determining that a more compelling
case for the parent-child privilege would involve a parent being compelled to inculpate a minor
child because that type of "strain on the family relationship that might impair the mother's ability
to provide parental guidance during the child's formative years"); United States v. Ismail, 756
F.2d 1253, 1258 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that courts may compel adults to testify against their
parents in a criminal trial, but declining to address situations involving "unemancipated minors
who generally require much greater parental guidance and support than do emancipated adults");
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Unemancipated Minor Child, 949 F. Supp. 1487, 1497 (E.D.
Wash., 1996) (recognizing that there should be some form of a parent-child privilege); see, e.g.,
In re Inquest Proceedings, 676 A.2d 790, 794 (Vt. 1996) (declining to decide "whether a parent's

interest in protecting a minor or incompetent child's confidential communications or conduct
could ever outweigh the public interest in the criminal fact-finding process").
287. Ross, supra note 19, at 90.
288. Id. at 99-100.
289. See supra note 7.
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For most prosecutors, there is no official protocol regarding
parental compulsion, suggesting that prosecutors have considerable
discretion in such circumstances. The U.S. Attorneys' Manual (the
"Manual"), which sets forth Department of Justice policies and
guidelines, takes the position against compelling the testimony of
family members in a grand jury investigation absent "specific
justification."290 However, once a charge has been filed, there is no
applicable policy. The only relevant "specific justification"
mentioned in the Manual is when the "testimony to be elicited relates
to a crime involving overriding prosecutorial concerns." 291 Any
number of situations can substantiate "overriding prosecutorial
concerns." For example, parental testimony may be compelled if (1)
there is no other available source for the testimony; (2) the testimony
sought is a confession by the accused; or (3) the alleged crime is
serious and warrants pursuing all available evidence. Without clear
guidelines, these standards delegate too much authority to individual
prosecutors without providing any legal recourse for the witness. At
the state level, no empirical research exists that reveals if district
attorneys have guidelines for compelling parental testimony in
juvenile or criminal proceedings.
The U.S. Supreme Court has never decided a case involving
judicial recognition of a parent-child privilege. In 1984, the Court
declined certiorari in a case involving three adolescent children
compelled to testify before a grand jury investigating their father for
murder. 292 Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts was
the first and last time the parent-child privilege was presented to the
Supreme Court for review. Moreover, no case involving the
290. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-23.211 (1997) ("Absent specific
justification, the Department will ordinarily avoid seeking to compel the testimony of a witness
who is a close family relative . .. of the person upon whose conduct grand jury scrutiny is
focusing.").
291. Id. The full list of "specific justifications" cited in the U.S. Attorneys'Manual include the
following situations:
(i) the witness and the relative participated in a common business enterprise and the
testimony to be elicited relates to that enterprise or its activities; (ii) the testimony to be
elicited relates to illegal conduct in which there is reason to believe that both the
witness and the relative were active participants; or (iii) testimony to be elicited relates
to a crime involving overriding prosecutorial concerns.

Id.
292. See Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203 (Mass. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1068 (1984).

608

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 43:551

"essential parent-child privilege" has ever been considered by the
Court.
The first reported case to raise the issue of a parent-child
privilege involved the notable lawyer Arthur Kinoy. 293 Kinoy's
daughter was believed to have been involved in a radical
underground group under investigation by the government in the late
1960s.294 The government served Kinoy with a subpoena requiring
that he testify before a grand jury regarding his daughter's
whereabouts. 295 Although Kinoy's adult daughter was not a target of
the government's investigation, the government believed that she
may have had information useful to its investigation. 296 Kinoy's
attempt to quash the subpoena, in the absence of a judicially
recognized parent-child privilege, was unsuccessful. 297
Both critics and supporters of a parent-child privilege widely
cite In re Agosto. 298 This is partly because the Nevada district court

approved a parent-child privilege with no distinction between adult
and minor children and between the child as a witness and the parent
as a witness. 299 Charles Agosto was thirty-two years old when he was
subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury investigating his father for
organized crime activities. 300 Agosto made three separate arguments
with respect to the harm that would be caused by compelling him to
testify against his father. "'
First, he argued that the law should protect him from disavowing
his loyalty to his father, which would occur if he were forced to
testify, and this would cause untold suffering to him as well as his
family. 302 Second, Agosto argued that compelled disclosure runs
counter to a vital component of the family unit: the encouragement
and fostering of reciprocal communication. 303 If the government is
293. In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
294. Id. at 401.
295. Id.
296. See id. at 406.
297. See id. at 406-07.
298. 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983).
299. See In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1328 (D. Nev. 1983).
300. See id. at 1299; see also Note, Parent-ChildLoyalty and Testimonial Privilege, supra
note 9, at 914.
301. In reAgosto, 553 F. Supp. at 1300.
302. Id. at 1300.
303. Id. at 1301-02.

Winter 2010]

TESTIFYAGAINST YOUR CHILD?

not estopped from such a practice, then not only would the singular
family unit suffer, but society would also suffer as mutual trust and
confidence in an essential relationship would erode. " Third, Agosto
argued that inter-generational loyalty is a social goal that is as
important as confidentiality within the marital relationship. 305
Therefore, the parent-child relationship should be given the same
legal protections currently afforded to spousal relationships. 306
The In re Agosto court criticized what it perceived was
becoming a common practice. Prosecutors and grand juries in the
District of Nevada subpoenaed children to testify against their
parents on three separate occasions within eighteen months of the
decision. 307 In a strong endorsement of the parent-child privilege, the
court held that a parent-child privilege is fundamental to the
protection of the privacy of familial relationships and the
inviolability and integrity of the family. 308 It reiterated its conviction
to intervene in matters that place individuals in a position of
choosing between loyalty to their family and loyalty to the state. 309
The family has been traditionally recognized by society as
the most basic human and psychological unit, and when the
state intrudes with its vast resources in an attempt to
disassemble that unit, then every safeguard under the law
must be abundantly exercised by the Court to guarantee that
the inherent imbalance of experience and expertise between

304. Id.

305. Id. at 1302.
306. See id. at 1301.
307. Id. at 1330. The court's mention is noteworthy because it may provide background and
an explanation for the court's determination that the government's practice of this tactic is
preempted.
308. See id. at 1328 ("It would be unjust for society to teach that while a child should listen to
his parents, he does so at the risk of being required to testify against them.").

309. See id. at 1331.
If the government in its zeal to pursue law enforcement goals steps into the realm of
constitutionally privileged relationships, the courts must intervene. In our democratic
system of justice which is based in part on respect for the law, if the law places family
members in a position of choosing between loyalty to a special, life-long bond as
opposed to involuntarily testifying to confidential and private matters, then the law
would not merely be inviting perjury, but perhaps even forcing it. The reticence to
testify or the fabrications which family members would invent to protect one another
would bring the government no closer to the truth it so zealously seeks.
Id. at 1326.
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parent and state is minimized to the greatest extent humanly
possible. 310
All but two of the cases that reject a common law parent-child
privilege involve the compulsion of testimony from adult children
against their parents. 31 Another category of cases involves parents
compelled to testify against their adult children. The only published
to testify about
decision involving parents compelled
communications made to them by their minor children is the case
that began this Article, Port v. Heard.312 Because state law did not
recognize a parent-child privilege, the Ports' framed all their
arguments under the federal constitution. 3' In dicta, the court noted
that had the case implicated FRE 501, the outcome may have been
different in light of the interests at stake. Only three federal courts
have considered recognition of a parent-child privilege since the U.S.
Supreme Court signaled receptivity toward creating new privileges in
Jaffee v. Redmond. 314 Two

of those cases involved children

compelled to testify against their parents. 315
One of these cases, In re Grand Jury,316 involved a criminal
investigation of an eighteen-year-old whose father was subpoenaed
to testify before a grand jury concerning conversations with his
son. 3" The father said that if he were forced to testify, it would

310. Id. at 1330 (quoting Brown v. Guy, 476 F. Supp. 771, 773 (D. Nev. 1979)).
311. See Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1985); Ubben v. O.F. (In re O.F.), 2009 ND
177, 773 N.W.2d 206 (refusing to recognize a common law parent-child privilege under the
privacy and liberty rights contained in the state constitution).
312. See id.
313. See id. at 428. The Ports did not make the argument that FRE 501 provides for a parentchild privilege because they were appealing a decision by a state trial court where state law
controlled. Id. Instead, the Ports confined their habeas petition to federal constitutional claims.
See id.
314. See Ricafort, supra note 108, at 283-88.
315. See id.
316. 103 F.3d 1140(3dCir. 1997).
317. Id. at 1142-43. The appeal presented two separate matters, both involving the same legal
question: whether the court should recognize a parent-child privilege. Id. at 1142. One case
involved a parent witness, while the other involved an adult child witness. Id. at 1142-43. The
Delaware case involved a motion to quash a subpoena issued to a sixteen-year-old daughter as to
her knowledge of the crime her father was being investigated for, but not specifically statements
the father made to her. Id. at 1143. The second appeal stemmed from a Virgin Islands case
involving a father who was subpoenaed to testify against his eighteen-year-old son regarding
communications he had with his son. Id. at 1142-43. The witnesses in both cases sought to quash
the grand jury subpoenas and asserted a parent-child privilege as grounds for their appeals. See id.
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irreparably harm his close and loving relationship with his son. 318
Efforts to quash the subpoena were rejected.319 Relying on the
Wigmore formula, the Third Circuit found that two of the Wigmore
prerequisites necessary to create a privilege were not met. 320
First, the court explained that the privilege is not indispensable
to the survival of the parent-child relationship because the privilege
will have no bearing on the communication between parents and
children. 321 The court reasoned that parents and children are typically
not aware that there is no testimonial privilege covering
communications between them. 322 Because of this lack of
knowledge, the existence or non-existence of a privilege is irrelevant
to their decision to discuss private matters. 323 This logic is a lot like
the tail wagging the dog. It would take only a well-publicized case
involving the forced betrayal of a child's confidences to his or her
parents, instigated by an eager prosecutor, to alert parents and
children to the fact that what they see and what they say within the
family can be used against them. The public was dismayed when
Ken Starr subpoenaed Monica Lewinsky's mother and forced her to
reveal the substance of her conversations with her daughter
concerning President Clinton. 324 Public condemnation of the
318. "I will be living under a cloud in which if my son comes to me or talks to me, I've got to
be very careful what he says, what I allow him to say. I would have to stop him and say, 'you
can't talk to me about that. You've got to talk to your attorney.' It's no way for anybody to live in
this country." Id. at 1143.
319. Seeid. at 1140-57.
320. Seeid. at 1152.
321. Seeid.
322. Id.
323. See id. The Court cited to the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence
comments that reached the same conclusion regarding the marital communications privilege. Id.
at 1152 n.21. Interestingly, nearly every state has diverged from federal law and has adopted a
marital communications privilege. Mikah K. Story, Twenty-First Century Pillow Talk:
Applicability of the Marital Communications Privilege to Electronic Mail, 58 S.C.L. REV. 275,
281-82 (2006) (discussing the prevalence of the marital communications privilege in both state
statutes and common law).
324. Although special prosecutor Ken Starr's subpoena of Monica Lewinsky's mother,
Marcia Lewis, to the grand jury investigating President Clinton involved an adult child and parent
relationship as well as an adult criminal investigation, it is a recent example of the public's
astonishment over the lack of a parent-child privilege and its disdain for the government's
interference in the parent-child relationship. See e.g., Richard T. Cooper et al., Lewinsky's Mother
Leaves Distraught After Testimony; Probe: Marcia Lewis Ends Second Day Before Federal
Grand Jury InvestigatingAlleged Affair Involving Clinton, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1998, at A16;
Richard T. Cooper et al., Monica 'sMom, the Reluctant Starr Witness Controversy, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 2, 1998, at El; Ruth Marcus, Starr Pushing Envelope, Former Prosecutors Say Grilling
Lewinsky's Mom Is Perfectly Legal and a Tactic Justice Officials Often Use, MILWAUKEE J.
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prosecutor's tactics encouraged federal and state legislators to
consider adopting a parent-child privilege. 325 Any rationale that
draws its strength from a general lack of knowledge is destined to
fail, and perhaps more importantly, does nothing to address the
concerns of those afflicted by government compulsion.
Legally savvy parents may very well be deterred from
communicating with their children by the lack of a privilege. 326
Social science research confirms that the lack of parent-child
communication has a negative psychological and social effect on
children's development. 327 Parents are the most important
contributors to the socialization of their children. 32 From birth, they
teach their children to act in socially appropriate ways and to become
productive members of society. 329 The family plays an extremely
important role in determining the child's initial trajectories in life.

SENTINEL, Feb. 15, 1998, at 1; Anna Quindlen, No Privilegefor Parents,NEWSWEEK, Jan. 17,
2000, at 74 (discussing parental outrage at the subpoena issued to Monica Lewinsky's mother);
Jerry Seper, Lewinky's Mom Cites "Hell" of Testimony, Requests Delay, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 24,
1998, at A6; Smith-Klocek, supra note 70, at 105 (quoting Ruth Ann Leach, Why Doesn't
Monica's Mom Refuse to Testify?, NASHVILLE BANNER, Feb. 17, 1998, at All (suggesting that
Marcia Lewis should have refused to testify and should have faced imprisonment rather than
violate "the precious bonds of trust she enjoys with her child")); Eric Zorn, With Ma on Stand,
Lawyers Can Mine the Mother Lode, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 12, 1998, at I (commenting on the legal
inconsistency which protects spousal communications but not confidential communications to
parents).
325. On February 23, 1998, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont pledged to introduce a bill to
allow Congress to consider the issue of creating a parent-child privilege in order to prevent
prosecutorial abuses. In his comments, Leahy waxed at length regarding his distaste for
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's treatment of Monica Lewinsky's mother, Marcia Lewis.
See supra note 200. It is worth noting that the congressman's disdain may have been due in part
to the subject matter that Starr was forcing Lewis to talk about.
326. See Press & Schulman, supra note 1, at 81 (describing the experience of the Ports, a
married couple threatened with contempt charges for refusing to testify about physical evidence
found in their home in a murder case against their seventeen-year-old son). Experiences like that
of the Ports will deter parents who are aware of the case.
327. See SHELDON & ELEANOR GLUECK, DELINQUENTS IN THE MAKING: PATHS TO
PREVENTION 50-55 (1952) (showing that the families of "non-delinquents" provided more
emotional support to one another and more frequently engaged in activities with one another).
328. In re A&M, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380 (App. Div. 1978) ("The role of the family,
particularly that of the mother and father, in establishing a child's emotional stability, character
and self-image is universally recognized. The erosion of this influence would have a profound
effect on the individual child and on society as a whole.").
329. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (plurality opinion)
("Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. It is
through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral

and cultural.").
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"Trajectories in crime and deviance are no exception. "330 Social
scientists who studied patterns in parental attachment and delinquent
behavior found that when parents devote time to their children,

communicate about their children's feelings and frustrations, and
provide guidance and advice, they prevent their children's
involvement in crime and delinquency. 331 Dr. Travis Hirschi, a
renowned expert in social control theory, believed that children who
lack a strong attachment to their parents have no way of learning

moral rules and are incapable of developing a conscience.332 He
found that an increased and intimate level of communication
between parents and their children decreased the likelihood that these
children would commit delinquent acts. "'
Two more leading researchers in social control theory, Rolf

Loeber and Magda Stouthamer-Loeber, concurred with Hirschi.
According to Loeber and Stouthamer-Loeber, if parents are generally
unaware of their children's activities, social relationships, and
whereabouts, then children have more opportunities to become
alienated from their parents and act without adult guidance and
supervision, thereby increasing the likelihood that they will commit
delinquent acts. ' A later study examined the relationship between

parental efficacy and emotional support.33 5 John P. Wright and
Francis T. Cullen found that parents who give their children
emotional support are more likely to exercise greater supervision
over them and form greater attachments to them.336 Sociologists
330. MICHAEL BENSON, CRIME AND THE LIFE COURSE 49 (2002).

331. Rolf Loeber & Magda Stouthamer-Loeber, Family Factorsas Correlatesand Predictors
of Juvenile Conduct Problems and Delinquency, in 7 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW
OF RESEARCH 29, 42 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1986); Francis T. Cullen, Social
Support as an Organizing Concept for Criminology: Presidential Address to the Academy of
CriminalJustice Sciences, 11 JUST. Q. 527, 528-40 (1994); Robert Sampson & John Laub, Crime
and Deviance over the Life Course, 55 AM. SOC. REV. 609, 609-27 (1990).
332. TRAVIS HIRSCHI, CAUSES OF DELINQUENCY 85-86 (2007). Children's attachment to
their parents decreases association with delinquent peers and involvement in delinquent behavior.
See Terence P. Thomberry, Toward an Interactional Theory of Delinquency, 25 CRIMINOLOGY
863, 873-74 (1987).
333. See HIRSCHI, supra note 332, at 93.
334. See Loeber & Stouthamer-Loeber, supra note 331, at 38. The natural sciences confirm
this theory with research explaining that adolescents (and younger children) are not physically
capable of well-reasoned and rational decision making. See supra Part III.
335. John P. Wright & Francis T. Cullen, ParentalEfficacy and Delinquent Behavior: Do
Control and Support Matter?, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 677, 682 (2001) (defining "parental efficacy" to
refer to the ability of parents to control and support their children).
336. Id. at 691-93.
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widely confirm that the parent-child relationship is crucial in creating
attachment and possible desistence from crime.
The court's second rationale for rejecting a parent-child
privilege is that children are not likely to think about the danger of
incriminating themselves before talking to their parents. 13' The
majority hypothesized that the "parent-child privilege is probably
one of the least important considerations in any child's decision as to8
3
whether to reveal some indiscretion, legal or illegal, to a parent."
A priori, parents would not deter their children from confiding in
them solely because no privilege protects their communication. "' In
other words, who else would children talk to, and what sensible
parents would not encourage honest disclosure in a time of trouble?
Seemingly, this argument could defeat the spousal privilege as well.
After all, people in intimate relationships share personal information,
usually without considering that the government may later seek to
compel their conversations. Most parents instinctively assume the
role of counselor, advisor, and nurturer, without considering the
possibility that the government might later force them to testify
against their children. The remote possibility of such a circumstance
hardly seems worth silencing their children's plea for help. Leveling
such a criticism against the parent-child privilege does not minimize
the importance of cloaking the parent-child relationship in the same
legal dressing conferred to the spousal relationship.
The court may be correct that the absence of a parent-child
privilege will have no bearing on most communications between
children and their parents. However, when criminal culpability is or
becomes a concern, then legal recognition of the privilege is
necessary. Unfortunately, a parent's knowledge of criminal
culpability may often be gained only after the communication has
occurred. Children may disclose incriminating information to their
parents for the purpose of seeking guidance, counsel, and support. A
parent-child privilege would allow parents to prospectively rely on

337. See In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1153 (3d Cir. 1997). The court does not offer an
explanation for why the same considerations do not nullify the spousal privilege. In her dissent,
Judge Mansmann finds support for a narrowly tailored parent-child privilege derived from the
same rationale that supports the spousal privilege. Id. at 1161-64 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
338. Id. at 1153. But see supra Part III.
339. See In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d at 1153.
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the guarantee that their communications with their children will
remain confidential. 340
The fourth criterion of the Wigmore test has been the focal point
of most of the debates regarding the proposed privilege. 34' The fourth
criterion requires that the benefit derived from the acquisition of the
testimony must be greater than the harm caused by obtaining such
testimony. 342 The Third Circuit found that any injury to the parentchild relationship resulting from the absence of a parent-child
privilege would be relatively insignificant compared to the benefit of
obtaining all relevant evidence.
In In re A&M, the court came to the opposite conclusion for
three reasons: (1) the well-being of the child's development; (2) the
ultimate good for society; and (3) the preservation of public
confidence in the legal system. 3" The probability of fracturing the
family unit is greatly increased when the government forces parents
to divulge their children's personal information in order to assist the
government in securing a conviction against the children. "'
Moreover, the psychological harm caused by even the threat of
forcing parents to incriminate their children is inestimable. Parents'
natural instinct is to protect their children from the threat of harm.
Some parents would no sooner go to jail than divulge incriminating
information about their children. 346 In the event that parents
340. See Susan Levine, Comment, The Child-ParentPrivilege: A Proposal,47 FORDHAM L.
REv. 771, 787-88 (1979) ("[T]he most salient effect of both the marital confidential
communications privilege and child-parent privilege is not so much that they encourage open
communication (although this may well be true in some instances), but that they protect the
confidentiality of a communication once it has been made.").
341. See, e.g., In re GrandJury, 103 F.3d at 1152-53.
342. Id. at 1152.
343. See id. at 1153. But see id. at 1160 n.5 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) ("I am convinced that
the damage resulting from compelling a parent to testify against his child, in most if not all cases,
outweighs the benefit associated with correct disposal of the litigation."). This fourth part of the
Wigmore test requires balancing the importance of the truth-seeking function of the judicial
system against the harm to the familial relationship.
344. See In re A&M, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380 (App. Div. 1978).
345. In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d at 1160 (Mansmann, J., concurring and dissenting) ("If the
state is permitted to interfere in that relationship by compelling parents to divulge information
conveyed to them in confidence by their children, mutual trust, and ultimately the family, are
threatened."); see also Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203, 1207-08 (Mass.
1983) (holding that different policy considerations are relevant when a child is called to testify
against a parent because a parent does not need the advice of a minor child in the same way a
child may need the advice of a parent).
346. See Press & Schulman, supra note 1. Gary Walker, a prosecuting attorney in Marquette,
Michigan and former co-chairman of the Juvenile-Justice Advisory Committee for the National
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acquiesce and testify, they may nevertheless testify falsely. 1 4
Neither scenario fulfills the government's purpose for compelling the
testimony, nor does either scenario enhance the truth-seeking
function of the justice system. 348
Finally, a third scenario involves parents testifying truthfully
against their children, which may cause the children to feel betrayed
and cause irreparable harm to the parent-child relationship. 141 In In re
Agosto, the court commented on the repercussions of compelling
parental testimony:
With the mutuality of the relationship in mind, the absurd
result of requiring parent and child to testify against one
another would be that children would be afraid to listen to
their parents, and vice versa, for any communications
would be subject to government inquiry, and could subject
the child or parent to either perjury, contempt, or familial
scorn. It would be hard to imagine anything which could
more effectively destroy confidence and communication
within the family unit. Free interchange of ideas is how the
parent-child relationship develops, and if this is cut off, the
family unit completely dissolves and is replaced with a
disjointed group of individuals, who while sharing the same
household, remain subject to the controls of an omnipresent
state, capable of intrusion into the minutest details of
human relationships. 350
The quintessential showdown between parents' unwillingness to
testify against their minor children and the government's purported
need for the parental testimony is best illustrated in the case that
introduced this Article-Port v. Heard. ' David Port's parents both
went to jail to maintain their loyalty to their son because they were
so adamant that testifying against him would be the ultimate act of
betrayal. The Ports raised the question of whether there is a
District Attorneys Association, commented that for a parent to be forced to testify against his or
her child "must be the seventh ring of hell." Axtman, supra note t11,at 1.
347. In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1309 (D. Nev. 1983).
348. See id.
349. See id. at 1329.
350. Id.
351. Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1985); see also In re Inquest Proceedings, 676
A.2d 790 (Vt. 1996) (holding parents in civil contempt for refusing to testify against their adult
children).
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constitutionally based privilege that allows parents to refrain from
testifying against their children. 352 The court considered and rejected
arguments that such a privilege derives from the right to privacy,
from the First Amendment right to exercise one's religion, or from
the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the
laws. "' In dicta, the court added that it may have decided differently
if the issue of whether it would recognize a common law privilege
under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence had been raised. "'
The court recognized that the forced disclosure of parents'
confidential communications with their children impedes the parents'
ability to foster trust, and potentially threatens the "sanctity and
integrity of the family unit." 35 5 In fact, the court noted that appellants
could have made an argument as to the psychological and social
strain that testifying against their own flesh and blood would have
had on them and on other similarly situated persons. 356
Intergenerational loyalty is a key ingredient to a wellfunctioning family and therefore a social value worthy of
preservation. A parent-child privilege serves to protect the
expectation of privacy concerning communications between parents
and their children, and more widely, the privacy of the family
relationship itself. "' One commentator's assessment of a policy that
permits access to evidence at the expense of the parent-child
relationship is to "win the battle and lose the war."358 The cruelty of
the dilemma that parents face when forced to decide between jail and
testimony against their children is a compelling reason to adopt a
legal doctrine that would assure that no parent would face this
decision.
The Third Circuit posited that parents' duty to "nurture and
guide" their children may require parents to disclose their children's
confidences to authorities when such disclosure is in their children's

352. See Port,764 F.2d at 428.
353. See id. at 430-32.
354. See id. at 428, 430 (noting that the issue had not been raised because state law and state
rules of evidence controlled the case).
355. Id. at429.
356. See id. at 430.
357. See Levine, supra note 340, at 788.
358. Daniel R. Coburn, Child-Parent Communications: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the
Child, 74 DICK L. REv. 599, 632 (1970).
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best interests, even though the children might not consent. " It is
certainly debatable whether a rule preventing parents from testifying
against their children impedes the parents' responsibility to foster the
well-being of their children. One could imagine how parents could
transform a negative set of circumstances into a valuable life lesson
for their children without disclosing parent-child confidences in a
judicial proceeding. Moreover, parents' discretion to informally
disclose information to third parties would not be affected by a
parent-child testimonial privilege. 360 Nonetheless, jurisdictions that
are concerned with stifling parents' willingness to testify against
their children can place the prerogative to assert the privilege with
the parent. 361 Barring any extreme situations that expose children to
physical danger or other harm, the law would not interfere with
parents' rights and obligations to do what they think is in the best
interest of their children.
In our society, minority status is inextricably intertwined with
parental oversight and authority.362 Extending assertion of the
privilege to the parent-witness is consistent with parents' right to
make decisions on behalf of their unemancipated minor children.
Many of the laws affecting children are inseparable from laws
authority and parental rights. "'
pertaining to parental
Unemancipated minors' prerogative to act autonomously is
significantly curtailed in our society. Minors who wish to enlist in
the military, marry, or seek medical procedures require parental
consent. A precursor to obtaining parental consent is communication
with parents, which in some circumstances, may include to the
disclosure of confidential information to parents-information that if
disclosed to a doctor, therapist, lawyer, or clergy member would be
359. See In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1153 (3d Cir. 1997).
360. Evidentiary privileges and disqualifications prohibit the compellability of a witness in an
adjudicatory proceeding such as a grand jury, evidentiary pretrial hearing, trial, or other
proceeding, but do not apply in non-testimonial situations.
361. Cf Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980) (holding that under federal
common law, the adverse spousal testimonial privilege empowers the witness spouse with the
authority to assert the privilege).
362. For example, courts almost always recognize that parents have the right to surreptitiously
monitor or record their children's phone conversations if the motive for doing so is to further the
best interests of the children. Parents have the ability to vicariously consent on their children's

behalf. See

CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING:

SURVEILLANCE INTHE INTERNET AGE §§ 6:23-:25 (3d ed. West 2008).
363. See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS? 17-18 (2005).
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protected by a legal privilege. Legal schemes that assign parents the
authority to either make decisions on behalf of their children or
require parental consent for certain conduct desired by their children
enhance the need for a parent-child privilege.
VI. ANTECEDENTS IN OTHER LEGAL SYSTEMS

The influence of international laws and customs on U.S. courts
has become more prevalent in the twenty-first century. Within the
juvenile justice sphere, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged the
unpopularity of the juvenile death penalty within the international
community. " The Court cited international practices and covenants,
treaties, and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child,365 all of which have denounced the death penalty for crimes
committed by juveniles under the age of eighteen. 366 Pointedly, the
Court noted that only seven countries other than the United States
have executed juvenile offenders since 1990: Iran, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and
China. 367 The Court's discussion in Roper v. Simmons is but one
example of how globalization is beginning to profoundly influence
our domestic laws and policies. Further, Roper demonstrates that the
recognition of a parent-child privilege in ancient law and among our
international counterparts should prove to be an influential
endorsement of a common law or statutory parent-child privilege in
the U.S. legal system.
A. Jewish Law
Traditional Jewish law forbids family members from testifying
against one another. 36 The Torah states, "The fathers shall not be put
364. "The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide
respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions." Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 578 (2005).
365. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 37, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990). The United Nations Convention has been ratified by
every country except the United States and Somalia. Id. at 576.
366. See id. at 575-76.
367. Roper, 543 U.S. at 577. Since then, each of these countries except for the United States
"has either abolished capital punishment for juveniles or made public disavowal of the practice."
Id. The Court also emphasized the United Kingdom's abolishment of the juvenile death penalty
since 1948. Id. at 577-78.
368. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Greenberg), 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 579, 581
(D. Conn. 1982).

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 43:551

to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for
the fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin." 369 The
list of family members initially covered by the prohibition included
spouses, parents, and children. 370 In modem times, the list of
relationships covered has broadened and now includes fathers,
mothers, brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts, brothers-in-law, sisters-inlaw, stepfathers, stepmothers, fathers-in-law, mothers-in-law, their
sons, daughters, sons-in-law, daughters-in-law, nephews, nieces, and
first cousins. "' Because protecting the sanctity of family is a core
value of the Jewish tradition, Jewish law holds that the importance of
the familial relationship outweighs the government's fact-finding
responsibility. 372
A few American courts have considered whether the Jewish
prohibition barring testimony against family members can be applied
on First Amendment grounds. ' In re Greenberg recognized a
limited privilege when a parent claims that testifying would violate
her religious beliefs. "' In this case, a mother was subpoenaed to
testify before the grand jury regarding her daughter's actions. She
claimed that as an observant Jew, her religion prohibited her from
testifying against her daughter. 3"' The federal district court
acknowledged a conflict between the mother's ability to freely
exercise her religion and the government's ability to compel her to
testify against her daughter. Ultimately the court allowed her to
refuse to answer questions that would incriminate her daughter. 376
Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the
Third Circuit found the Jewish prohibition on parent-child testimony

369. Smith-Klocek, supra note 70 (citing Deuteronomy 24:16). This biblical passage is also
cited as the basis for the proscription against self-incrimination, since "a man is related to
himself." See AARON KIRSCHENBAUM, SELF-INCRIMINATION IN JEWISH LAW 40-41 (1970). See
generally Irene M. Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, In the Beginning: The Talmudic Rule
Against Self-Incrimination,63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 955 (1988).
370. See Smith-Klocek, supra note 70.

371. See id. at n.25 (citing 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 587 (1996)).
372. Id.at 110.
373. In re Grand Jury Proceedings of John Doe, 842 F.2d 244, 245-48 (10th Cir. 1988);
Greenberg, 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) at 580-82.
374. Greenberg, 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) at 585-87. It did not, however, recognize
a parent-child privilege. Id.
375. Id. at 581.
376. Id. at 585-87.
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to be outweighed by a compelling governmental interest. "' The
court did not state that a grand jury investigation would always
outweigh the right to invoke the parent-child privilege on religious
grounds; however, in this case, the court held that the government's
interest outweighed important religious beliefs. "' Because the court
declined to state a bright-line rule that the governmental interest
would always outweigh religious beliefs, the court did not set criteria
to determine when the balance would favor religious prohibition.
B. Roman Law
The Romans believed that society's foundation depended on a
cohesive family unit.3 79 Like the Jewish prohibition barring family
members from testifying against one another, the Romans similarly
barred certain persons from testifying. 38 Early Roman law
prohibited persons closely related to the plaintiff or to the defendant
from testifying. "' The Romans believed that the testimony of family
members was of little or no value since they would have strong
urges to misrepresent the truth in order to protect the family. 382
Rather than weigh the credibility of the testimony on a case-by-case
basis, the government adopted a law simply disqualifying any
witness who fell within this category of persons. Roman law is the
embodiment of the view that the preservation of familial relations
supersedes law enforcement's need for evidence. Any person who
violated this legal and social code was considered disloyal and
unworthy of being believed. 383 Cicero's prosecution of the governor
of Sicily, Caius Verres, in 70 B.C.E. for extortion against the citizens
of Sicily, demonstrates that the parent-child privilege was well-

377. In re The Grand Jury Empaneling of the Special Grand Jury, 171 F.3d 826, 830-32 (3d

Cir. 1999).
378. Id. at 832-37.
379. See Watts, supra note 28, at 592.

380. See id.; HUNTER, supra note 70, at 1056.
381. Referred to as "testimonium domesticum," early Roman law mandated that patrons,
freedmen, and slaves could not be compelled to testify against each other. Watts, supra note 28,
at 592. Other restrictions placed on witness eligibility was the requirement that in civil cases,
witnesses must be over the age of puberty, and the requirement that in criminal cases, witnesses
must be at least twenty years of age. HUNTER, supra note 70, at 1056.
382. Watts, supra note 28, at 592.
383. Id.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW

[Vol.43:551

established in ancient Rome and used even in notorious cases. 384 One
of Cicero's claims was that Verres acquired artwork as governor
without proof that he had purchased them. 385 Further, Cicero alleged
that Verres had divided the extorted money into parts for himself and
his future defense teams, and to bribe the eventual jurors, which
suggested that he knew he would be caught eventually. 386 To bolster
Verres' prosecution, Cicero attempted to summon the patronus387 of
the governor of Sicily, Hortensius. 388 Nevertheless, under Roman
law, Hortensius was not eligible as a witness because of his close
familial relationship with Verres. 389 Despite the preclusion of a key
prosecution witness, Cicero supported the testimonial privilege as a
means toward maintaining social order through stable families.390
C. ContemporaryInternationalLaw
Roman law was eventually codified as Corpus Juris Civilis
during the reign of Justinian the Great, who ruled from 527 to 565
A.D. "' Many European countries initially modeled their laws after
this code. 392 Napoleon Bonaparte, the Emperor of France from 1804
to 1815, embraced the testimonium domesticum and included it in his
Napoleonic Code. "' Today, the French Civil Code prohibits parents
and children from testifying against one another in a dispute. "'

384. Id. at 592-93; ANDREw M. RIGGSBY, CRIME AND COMMUNITY IN CICERONIAN ROME

176 (1st ed. 1999).
385. A. H. J. GREENIDGE, THE LEGAL PROCEDURE OF CICERO'S TIME 493-94 (Augustus M.
Kelley ed., Rothman Reprints 1971) (1901).
386. See HUNTER, supra note 70, at 147.
387. Patronus refers to an ancient Roman social relationship in which the senior party served
a father-like role. See Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer
and Client, 16 CAL. L. REV. 487, 488 (1928).

388. See id. at 488.
389. Id.
390. See Watts, supra note 28, at 593. In Ancient Greece, women had such a subordinate role
that their participation in the legal system as witness or litigant was virtually non-existent, making
the need for a parent-child privilege obscure. S. C. TODD, THE SHAPE OF ATHENIAN LAW 201
(1995).
391. Watts, supra note 28, at 593.

392. Id.
393. See id. at 592-93.
394. See id. at 593. The French Civil Code previously stated, "[n]o one can be summoned as a
witness if he is a blood relation, or a relative by marriage in direct line, or husband and wife of
one of the parties, even although divorced." Id. (quoting CODE CIVIL art. 248, § 336 (G. Koch
trans. 1963) (Fr.)). The Code included the following relations: father, mother, grandfather,
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The prevailing view in Western European civil law countries
disfavors forcing family members to divulge confidences between
one another. Italian law has recognized a testimonial privilege for the
"lineal relatives" of parties in civil and criminal cases, unless the
cause of action concerns one's familial status, family relations, or
certain other family-related matters. "' The German Code of
Criminal Procedure allows persons who are or were directly related
by blood, marriage, or adoption to the accused to refuse to testify. 396
Sweden also protects communications between family members. '9'
Russia expressly prohibits close relatives-including spouses,
siblings, parents, and children-from being forced to testify for or
against one another.398 Article 51 of the Russian Constitution
proclaims that "[n]o one shall be obliged to testify against himself or
herself, or against his or her spouse and close relatives as specified
by law." 3 99 Under Japanese law,
[a]ny person may refuse to give testimony when there is the
fear that such testimony may result in criminal prosecution
or conviction against

. .

. [h]is/her spouse, blood relatives

within the third degree of kinship or relatives by affinity
within the second degree of kinship or a person who
formerly had such relative relationships with him/her...
[or] his/her guardian. 400

Both the Taiwanese Code of Criminal Procedure and the
Austrian Code of Civil Procedure follow the Japanese Code
grandmother, son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter, brother, sister, brother- and sister-in-law,
and the husband or wife of the accused, even if the spouses are divorced. Id.
395. CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE art. 247 (Italy); CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE art. 199,
(Italy); see also G.L. CERTOMA, THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 205 (1985).
396. Strafproze3ordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure] tit. VI, § 52, translatedin THE
GERMAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 42 (Horst Niebler trans., 1965).
397. R attegAngsbalken [RB] [Code of Civil Procedure] 36:3 (Swed.), translated in THE
SWEDISH CODE OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE 197 (James Hurst trans., 1999) ("A spouse, former
spouse, relative by blood or by marriage in direct lineal ascent or descent, or sibling of a party, or
a person so related by marriage to a party that one of them is, or has been, married to a sibling of
the other, or a person correspondingly related to a party, is not obliged to testify.").
398. GENNADY M. DANILENKO & WILLIAM BURNHAM, LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 368 (1999).
399. Id. at 368-69.
400. KEISOHO [Code of Criminal Procedure], act no. 131, art. 147 (Japan). "A person who has
the relationship prescribed in the preceding Article with one or more of the accomplices or codefendants may not refuse to give testimony on matters relating only to the other accomplices or
co-defendants." Id. at art. 148.
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closely."4 o The Philippines recognizes a filial privilege that shields
persons from being compelled to testify against their parents,
children, or other direct ascendants or descendants. 402
Common law countries have not followed their civil law
counterparts' acceptance of a parent-child privilege. Australia is
currently one of the few common law countries that recognizes a
parent-child testimonial privilege. "' South Africa entitles persons
under the age of eighteen who are charged with an offense to be
assisted by their parents or guardians during criminal proceedings. "
South African courts have interpreted this provision to be used only
for the child's benefit, not to the detriment of the accused. 115 Some
argue that South Africa's Criminal Procedure Act, along with its
Children's Act, 40 6 place South Africa in a strong position to
recognize a parent-child testimonial privilege. 407 The United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child sets forth many principles
consistent with the adoption of a parent-child privilege. 408 Canada
and Great Britain are both parties to the Convention, which was
ratified in 1989.409
CONCLUSION

The juvenile justice system's irreversible shift from
rehabilitation to a characteristically more punitive system makes
meaningful access to due process rights even more vital. Tougher
juvenile sentencing schemes and the rising rate of juvenile
401. See Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Civil Procedure Statute], Stand Gazette No. 7/2006, §§
321, 380 (Austria); TAIWAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, art. 180 ("A witness may refuse to
testify ... [if] [t]he witness is or was the spouse, lineal blood relative, blood relative within the
third degree of kinship, relative by marriage within the second degree of relationship, family
head, or family member of the accused or private prosecutor.").
402. Rules of Court, rule 130, § 25 (Phil.).
403. Evidence Act, 1995, § 18 (Austl.) (applying to criminal proceedings in all federal courts
and the courts of the Australian Capitol Territory).
404. Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 s. 73(3) (S. Aft.).
405. Melanie Fourie, Recognition of a Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege in South African
CriminalProcedure:Lessons from the United States of America, 21 S. AFR. J. CRIM. JUST. 259,
273 (2008).
406. Children's Act 38 of 2005 (S. Aft.).
407. See Fourie, supra note 405, at 259.
408. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 16 (Nov. 20, 1989) ("No
child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home
or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation.").
409. Id.
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prosecution in adult courts have increased children's exposure to
adult-like punishments. The fact that the government can, at its
discretion, compel parents to testify against their children quickly
erodes the role of parents as advisors and counselors to their
children. In essence, who else are children going to talk to? Society
stresses the important role that parents plays in their children's
development, including both positive and negative events during
childhood. At this moment in time, our societal expectations of the
parents' role are in conflict with the lack of legal protection afforded
to parent-child communications. Such a conflict has the potential to
undermine parents' ability to live up to the expectations society
places on them.
The legal system is designed to prevent miscarriages of justice,
and this result can be accomplished by adopting a parent-child
privilege. Prosecutors, in addition to seeking justice, have an
obligation to society, and society-through its courts, agencies, and
10
citizenry-has an interest in promoting and fostering family unity. 4
The means of assessing the need for a parent-child privilege is to
identify all of the ways in which the lack of the privilege impacts
children, families, and society, and to weigh that impact against the
truth-seeking function of the judicial system.

410. In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1325 (D. Nev. 1983) ("There can be little doubt that the
confidence and privacy inherent in the parent-child relationship must be protected and sedulously
fostered by the courts. while the government has an important goal in presenting all relevant
evidence before the court in each proceeding, this goal does not outweigh an individual's right of
privacy in his communications within the family unit, nor does it outweigh the family's interests
in its integrity and inviolability, which spring from the rights of privacy inherent in the family
relationship itself.").
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